Interview with Benjamin V. Cohen, March 19, 1975

BIRDWHISTELL: Mr. Cohen, to begin with, when did you first meet Chief Justice Vinson and what was your position then?

COHEN: I can't really remember the first time I met him. I imagine it was either in '33 or '34. I was working closely with Chairman Sam Rayburn of the Interstate Commerce Committee, first on the Securities Act of 1933 and later on SEC [Securities and Exchange Commission] Acts and Holding Company Act. I think I saw a great deal of Chairman Rayburn, who was not then Speaker of the House but chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee of the House. And I think Vinson was then in Congress. I think he was chairman of one committee but 00:01:00I can't remember what it was. But he was a close friend of Rayburn's. I think I met him either in Rayburn's office or apartment at some time.

BIRDWHISTELL: Yes, he, Vinson, was chairman of the Tax Subcommittee of the Ways and Means Committee.

COHEN: I think that's right.

BIRDWHISTELL: What was your position at that time when Vinson was in Congress?

COHEN: I was first asked to come down because the administration had sent the Securities Act of 1933 down to Congress and Mr. Rayburn's committee and he was not happy with the way it was being handled by those who were handling 00:02:00the bill for the administration. I think part of that was due to the questions raised by some of the counsel for the investment bankers. They were not quite satisfied with the answers. At least, that's what I assume. All I knew was it was reported Rayburn wanted help. And he first asked Raymond Moley who was then one of the primary advisors to the president, couldn't he find some independent authorities to help him and Moley turned to Professor Felix Frankfurter for help. And Frankfurter said he would do what he could but his own time was 00:03:00limited and he recommended [?] Landis from Harvard and he recommended me and Tom Corcoran, who was already down in Washington at the RFC [Reconstruction Finance Corporation]. That was our position at that time. Unlike now, the administration was cooperating with the Congress. It wasn't a matter of confrontation. We didn't even know whether in some ways we were working for Rayburn or for [Franklin D.] Roosevelt.

BIRDWHISTELL: I see. Well then, while you served in this position and Vinson was in Congress, did you have any dealings with him of a business nature?

COHEN: Not really -- I think I met him when occasionally he was at Rayburn's and perhaps elsewhere. And I regarded him as an important member of 00:04:00Congress and a close friend whose views were somewhat similar to Rayburn's. But I can't give you or recall any specific details of our meetings or conversations during that preliminary period.

BIRDWHISTELL: Of course, as a Congressman, Vinson tended to be a straight New Dealer type and then he left Congress in 1938 and went to the U.S. Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia. From there, after the war began, he became director of [the Office of] Economic Stabilization. What was your position when he was director of Economic Stabilization?

COHEN: I had come over to the White House when [James] Byrnes became the 00:05:00first director of stabilization. And worked along with Byrnes until he transferred from economic stabilization to the Office of War Mobilization. But at that time, I think it was on Byrnes' recommendation that Vinson was asked to come in to succeed him as director of Economic Stabilization. And he came in at a very decisive time. We had been working on the Stabilization Act which passed 00:06:00in October, '42, if I remember correctly. And inflation was getting out of control even when the act was passed. And the first task was to try to find the formula for wages to catch up with existing prices. Through the Labor Board, what was called the "Little Steel Formula" was announced which tended to bring wages and prices into some balance. But before the year was over we were greatly worried because food prices, which were not controlled, were rising and threatening to upset the balance we were trying to maintain between prices and 00:07:00cost of living and wages. At that time there was a great difficulty in controlling prices of farm products. It was proposed, I think by the OPA [Office of Price Administration], that the president be given authority to requisition or buy food products and redistribute them, if necessary, at a lower 00:08:00price than paid the farmers so as to maintain the balance. This in a sense was subsidizing food prices in order to hold down consumer prices. And in order to bring things together before Mr. Byrnes left the Economic Stabilization, we worked to put this plan in one executive order so that it was clarified that with this added power to indirectly control food prices, the government was determined to hold the wage and price lines approximately where they were, except in cases of extreme hardship and inequity. And it was quite a job for 00:09:00Justice Byrnes and Judge Vinson even with their congressional experience and ability, to obtain the concurrence of the various government agencies involved and the representatives of labor and industry on the War Labor Board. When we got the order tied up, Mr. Byrnes moved on to his new position and left the most difficult job of administering and enforcing the hold-the-line order to Judge Vinson.

BIRDWHISTELL: After Justice Byrnes left, as you point out, and Judge Vinson came into the office, did he make any noticeable changes in the office other than the way Justice Byrnes had run the office? Did they have different styles?

COHEN: I should say no, although the first real tough problem for Judge Vinson was the railroad case, where unfortunately the panel working on it, while 00:11:00they pretended to follow the order, gave it a very liberal construction to the order which would make it difficult to hold the line as was intended. And so that presented a very difficult problem when Vinson decided after not only examining the record but consulting with the prominent public members on the War Labor Board, including Mr. William Davis who was chairman, Frank Graham, and 00:12:00Wayne Morse. They were three important men and another man, I think his name was [?] Mitchell, from Pennsylvania who had quite a record in handling labor disputes. That is in the administration then one had ability to work with people interested in various ways so you could be sure you weren't merely making a judgment in a vacuum. And Judge Vinson, after hearing the facts and making his own consultations, decided to hold the line firmly. It was a very courageous act. As you may know, Senator [Harry S] Truman introduced 00:13:00legislation on behalf of the labor people, railroad labor people, to break the line. But it held. I wasn't familiar with all the later cases but the line held marvelously. And the economists who are now talking about the inadequacies of control and unworkability of controls during the war do not do at all justice to what the record shows. That is, the wholesale price index was held within three percent from the date of the order to the European and the Japanese 00:14:00armistices. True, a great deal was lost when controls were prematurely released. Released before there was time for industry to fill up the pipeline with civilian supplies. And also, unhappily, at the same time, the Excess Profit Tax was repealed so it made it advantageous for industry to charge what the traffic would bear. Before supplies could be adequately increased, as a result of the diversion of resources from fighting to civilian supplies which had been quite limited during the war.

BIRDWHISTELL: One big problem, too, that arose soon after Judge Vinson took 00:15:00over was petroleum prices and having to hold the line on those and stop congressional action from raising those, too, I think.

COHEN: Yes, I know there was but I'm not familiar with the details. There's others that can give those to you much better than I.

BIRDWHISTELL: I understand then from what you're saying that when you and Justice Byrnes went to war mobilization and Judge Vinson came in to be economic stabilizer that most of the dealings between the two offices were done through Mr. Ed Prichard. Is that correct? Did Vinson ever come over to you and ask you questions about the running of the office?

COHEN: Yes. Mr. Prichard had worked with Mr. Byrnes and me before Judge 00:16:00Vinson became the economic stabilizer. He was a natural channel of communication between our two offices. He was a close friend as well as a co-worker and we frequently discussed the problems of our two offices. Mr. Vinson would consult with Mr. Byrnes quite frequently. Sometimes I would see Mr. Vinson with Mr. Byrnes and sometimes alone. We were all at ease with one another and worked well together.

BIRDWHISTELL: What type of relationship did Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Vinson have? Were they close?

COHEN: They had a close relationship. Justice Byrnes recommended Judge Vinson for his position. And I think their past relationships had always been most cordial and friendly. Each respected the abilities of the other. So, I think, so far as I can recall, their relations were very close and cordial and cooperative.

BIRDWHISTELL: Then, of course, after Justice Byrnes left the Office of War Mobilization Vinson again followed him into the position. I was wondering, why 00:17:00did Justice Byrnes leave the Office of War Mobilization?

COHEN: Well, that is, I think for various reasons. I think you can get that better from Justice Byrnes' own writing. He was a little disappointed by being urged to go into the vice-presidential race. It proved embarrassing to him when there was some opposition to him although Roosevelt had urged him to go into the race. But some of the city bosses, so to speak, political bosses and some of the labor representatives raised questions as to whether he would add to 00:18:00the ticket in the northern urban states. And so the support was shifted by a letter that indicated the president, while not definitely saying he was no longer supporting Byrnes, he would also be satisfied with [William O.] Douglas or Truman. That left some scars, I imagine. But it was also that, while Byrnes was not certain as to what he wanted to do in the future, I think he got off the Court because of the war and was not eager to go too far beyond the war in the 00:19:00same sort of activities. The war mobilization was then going to be diverted to the problem of conversion. And I don't know, I think he thought he had enough of that particular type of work and he thought it was a good breaking off point.

BIRDWHISTELL: After Justice Byrnes left that office and Vinson came in, I understand that you stayed in the position you were in. Is that right?

COHEN: No. I left about the same time as Mr. Byrnes.

BIRDWHISTELL: Were you there at any time while Vinson was director of war mobilization?

COHEN: No, no.

BIRDWHISTELL: From your vantage point at that time, were you able to watch how 00:20:00Vinson was running the office?

COHEN: No. I really wasn't in very close contact afterwards because I was, for a brief period, out of government. And my interest at that time was turning to the problems of peace on the international scene rather than on the domestic scene.

BIRDWHISTELL: In what capacity?

COHEN: Well, as I had been on some of the committees working on the peace problems in the State Department while I was with Mr. Byrnes, I hoped to be asked to participate on some of the peace work. It didn't immediately 00:21:00develop but when Justice Byrnes became secretary of state he asked me to join him as counselor of the State Department.

BIRDWHISTELL: Did you have any working relationship or personal relationship at all with Vinson when he became secretary of treasury under Truman?

COHEN: I would see him occasionally, but I was not brought into the problems that he faced in the Treasury.

BIRDWHISTELL: Did you get any indication of the extent to which he was involved in the politics of the Truman administration, or how close an advisor he was to Truman?

COHEN: No. I really was not familiar with his talks with Truman. Mr. 00:22:00E. M. Bernstein who was in the Treasury at that time and later went over to the 00:23:00[International] Monetary Fund, might possibly be able to give you some account of the work at the treasury during that period.

BIRDWHISTELL: I contacted him before I visited this time and I didn't get a response from him. Possibly he was out of his office. But I hope to talk with him.

COHEN: I really don't know how close his relation developed. He was working very closely with Harry White on the international monetary problems.

BIRDWHISTELL: I was looking over some things here that we might not have mentioned about Vinson when he was economic stabilizer or Office of War mobilizer.

COHEN: As I say; Ed Prichard and Paul Porter ought to be able to give 00:24:00you so much more than I could and probably their recollections would be more definite because mine would be, in a sense, only on the fly.

BIRDWHISTELL: Well, then I suppose that's all we need to pursue it because I really don't know of any areas we could explore, unless you know of any goings-on that we haven't talked about yet.

COHEN: No, I really don't. Unless you think of some specific thing that Mr. Porter or Mr. Prichard mentioned that you thought I might have anything to do with. But I don't offhand recall any myself.

BIRDWHISTELL: Okay. Thank you.

[End of Interview]

Benjamin V. Cohen by Terry L. Birdwhistell - Jean Schmeisser