Interview with Bevan Brown, July 14, 2016

MUMMERT: The following--uh--is an oral history interview conducted as part of the Tennessee Valley Authority Retirees Association Oral History Pilot Project. The person being interviewed is Bevan Brown.[1] Mr. Brown is a retiree of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). He worked at the Tennessee Valley Authority for 38 years between September 1950 and September 1988. He is being interviewed by Philip Mummert as part of the Pilot Oral History Project. The interview location is Christ--uh--United Methodist Church in Knoxville, Tennessee. And today is Thursday, July 14th 2016. --Uh--the interview is now beginning. --Uh--Mr. Brown--uh--let me begin by asking you if you could describe very briefly for me the circumstances that--uh--led you to becoming 00:01:00employed at the Tennessee Valley Authority.

BROWN: Those circumstances are real easy to describe. I had just finished college in a degree in hydraulics and hydrology, loved water. Got a call on the farm where I lived from a branch chief interviewing me and asking me about the possibility of a job. I was looking for a job like at TVA, and it didn't take me long to express a lot of interest in that job. I got a telegram in a day or two from a personnel officer offering me a job and off I came to Knoxville.

MUMMERT: And--uh--you stayed in Knoxville for more than 38 years?

BROWN: Well, I was transferred--uh--in about I guess, in about 1970-something to Chattanooga for a year to take over a division there of environmental 00:02:00quality, or something like that was the name of it. I spent a year there, then I was transferred out to Norris to be r--Tom Ripley Deputy Director in the Office of Natural Resources. And then I was transferred back to Knoxville, where I ended up retiring. So, but I spent most all my time in Knoxville.

MUMMERT: When you started, which was in 1950, what was your position or your job at that time?

BROWN: I was classified as a Civil Engineer I, my pay was $3,200 a year. As a sideline to a degree, my daddy thought I was an--a success to begin with. And I found out my--later after he died that he never made as much as $3,200 a year. So that amount of money made me a success in my hometown as far as my 00:03:00daddy was concerned. And s--that was the starting point of my initial time with TVA.

MUMMERT: Okay, and what sort of work did you do when you just--were just hired?

BROWN: When I was just hired, I worked in a branch called the--uh--uh--Flood Control Branch, I believe at that time. And--uh--I did jobs like analyzing after we'd had a flood how good a pr--decisions were made. I worked to improve the process of doing that. I did whatever I was told to do to a degree, I asked to do and did it to the best of my ability. And fortunately for me, I was promoted up and moved up from it. When I first came to TVA, there were some people that I considered to be almost like in a c--celestrial position, the division director, and they were off in the wild blue yonder as far as I was concerned. And to-- I never realized that someday I would be sitting in that position 00:04:00myself on it before I retired. So--uh--overall I was extremely pleased from my early decision. I had an offer one time to leave TVA for a reason, I turned it down. And I'm delighted that I turned it down.

MUMMERT: When you began in--at TVA in 1950--uh--TVA was about 17 years old, itself. And--uh--if I'm correct, I think that most of or many of the dam projects--uh--had been built. And you--when you came in, probably You weren't--it--it was shortly after--uh--much of the whole controlled river system had been built and needed to be operated. Was the--uh--the flood 00:05:00control projects that you worked on when you first started having to do with trying to fine tune the--uh--the system of dams, or was it flooding in other parts of the Valley or both?

BROWN: It was a little bit of both. --Uh--my job in the br--when I first came was to monitor the decisions that had been made relative to operating the system by the River Control Branch and to come up with ways that might have made a better decision on the operation. You're right, I cannot think of a major dam project that was constructed, maybe one up around Kingsport, Boone up there in that industry was con--finished after I came. But all the projects essentially in operation when I came, and so I was involved in the operational part after the dams were built.

MUMMERT: How many--uh--people were doing work like you were doing at 00:06:00that point in time, app--approximately?

BROWN: The branch I was in probably had 20 people, very small. Branches were fa--fairly small then on it. And--uh--composed of a manager person or two, some engineers of different staff levels and a few engineering aides on it. And--uh--and then things thereafter on it. One of the reasons we had a branch called the Flood Control Branch surprisingly was Red Wagner's desire for TVA always because it was one of his purposes was flood control, one was navigation and one was power. He always insisted while he was there that there ought to be a Flood Control Branch. Later after he left, the Flood Control Branch 00:07:00name was changed. And, but that was the reason of the existence of the branch from the very beginning.

MUMMERT: Now, who was Red Wagner?

BROWN: Red Wagner was Chairman of the Board of TVA for many years and--and had a lot to do with many, many different aspects of TVA at that time, including, surprisingly, refusing that any TVA projects being built not be named for a person but be named for something like the geographic region or something like that on it. I always thought that was a great decision cause politics entered into so much into naming dams and projects like the Corps of Engineers on it. And---uh--that was one of the things that he did that I always remember about him.

MUMMERT: --Uh--can you give some examples or--uh--some stories about that?

BROWN: Well we, something said about earlier that all the dams had 00:08:00been completed. There's one or two that were done after I came here, on it--on the Duck River and on at Normandy and others. And I believe there was a Congressman by the name of Davis, I'm not sure, that felt people wanted a dam named for him, and so forth on it. And Wagner stood his ground. Also, we were looking one time for a steam plant site up in Kentucky, and they I think they wanted it named for somebody in Kentucky, but Wagner would not budge on that regardless of the politics involved on it.

MUMMERT: Now the--the flood--types of flood control work you did--uh--can you give a specific example of what you might have run into in those days?

BROWN: Later, in those days, and especially later on, I was in--very much involved into the day-to-day operation of the dams, primarily for flood control but for power on it. --Uh--in the late--uh--1980s, we had a condition 00:09:00that I don't think's ever existed before then, and I don't think has existed since then. We had a major, major flood co--consideration with the rainfall and runfall that never had happened before. That we did not have data that showed why or where it happened. And--uh--for about three days, everything was extremely hectic. We ended up setting some goals at that time on operation of the reservoir system like filling some dams higher than they had ever been filled and releasing from like Douglas Dam twice as much water than it's ever--has ever been released. And as it turned out, practically all of our goals were fulfilled on it. One of the goals was operation of Norris Dam. 00:10:00We set a goal of not flooding Highway 33, where it crossed--uh--the Clinch River. But we also set a goal not to flood the Clinton's water treatment plant or its wastewater treatment plant. Both of those goals were obtained on it and it was very interesting. Mentioning interesting things, during that operation there were a lot of houseboats anchored just upstream from Norris Dam. It became obvious we were going to have to open the gates and let a lot of water out of Norris Dam to keep it from filling higher than we wanted it filled. We sent our field people in contact of all those owners that we could contact. And I think we contacted them all and told them they needed to move their houseboats cause we weren't sure we opened the gates whether these houseboats were going to be pulled over the reservoir top and destroyed. Some of them were not 00:11:00moved. I consulted with the General Counsel's office and was told if it was deemed in my power that--that the gates had to be opened to go ahead and open them and if the houseboats went over the reservoir, bad luck for the owner. As it turned out the v--velocity of the water did not move any of the houseboats and everything went extremely well. But we were faced so in a period of about three days of operation like we'd never been faced before. I was supervisor of the operation of dams then, and for about three days, the only sleep I got was practically none. I only went to my apartment took a shower and came back to work. I remember Dick Freeman, I had to report two or three times a 00:12:00day to the board on what was going on and how we were fairing. And obviously, it showed on my face that I was just about worn out. After it was all over, Dave said we've got to do something about having more people trained to help in the cases like that. Well, you can't train people like that in a few days, and so it was never needed before. But, I remember Dick saying we can't have people as tired as Bevan is obviously when he reported to us on it.

MUMMERT: And the Freemans that you mentioned were board members, and this was probably toward the end of the 1970s or early 1980s?

BROWN: Yes.

MUMMERT: When some--uh--when--when did you fir--when would you first have found out in your own mind or realized that there was a critical situation? This was a time before we really had the kind of computer technology we do 00:13:00today. --Um--did you have--uh--the field people tell you something or was it a gut feeling or? Did you follow the--uh--rain patterns?

BROWN: It was a combination of all those things. We had field people, and everything but in this particular case, for some re--and we had a lot of st--uh--rainfall gauges all over the Valley to measure rainfall that reported in at least daily. We had some stream gauges that reported in daily, but for some reason upstream of Douglas Dam, all the rainfall was missed by all our gauging systems. So it was quite a surprise to find Douglas filling up far faster than anything we thought it could be. You're right, we did not have computers, a lot of it was hand-ground process. I found out about the problem, I went home from work and I got a call from subordinates said we got a problem, and I 00:14:00went right back to work then that night. And we did have a problem, things were rather chaotic. And we sat down and established some goals and got organized and went from there. As part of the job, I had then, I had to report to my supervisor what was happening. I had the TVA operators get in touch with every board member, and I reported to the board member and the General Manager what all was going on and what was happening. I was instructed to contact the mayor of Knoxville and the mayor of Chattanooga to tell them things might not be like you hoped for them to be, but we just don't know. And I got a great reception from both of the mayors. The mayor of Chattanooga, I remember, gave me a person's name and told me to keep in contacting and him and he appreciated me contacting them. As somewhat of a sideline, we did flood some property and homes in Chattanooga before it was over with, we could not help that on it. 00:15:00The conditions in Knoxville wouldn't as bad as we thought they might be. And so that worked out well on it. --Uh--we had to get some people into the design division to find out how high we could fill Douglas Dam without the dam failing cause we were going to fill it up higher than it had ever been under our plans. And it was a busy, hectic time, and our telephones nearly rang-off, people wanted to know what's going to happen at my house, what's going to happen at my property and everything like that on it. And they wanted to talk to somebody that could give them a good answer. The people that could give them a good answer versus the people that were having to do the work, were the same people and so we were really stressed to meet the situation. I don't believe a condition like that's has ever existed before then, I'm sure, and I don't believe a condition like that has existed since then. Sitting on the 00:16:00sideline, I sometimes wonder now what's going to happen now, everything has changed, but it was--it was a great surprise, a big surprise for us. But at the end I was so pleased that all of our goals were met and no violation of what we had planned. And we minimized the damage that--that was caused, but there was still very serious damage in Chattanooga on it.

MUMMERT: Now you've mentioned a couple of things. I want to jump back and ask you about a couple of questions about something--a few things you mentioned. Before we do that though, we probably for someone that's listening to this--uh--we need to get some p--give some perspective--uh--. Douglas Dam is on the r--French Broad River--uh--east of Knoxville I would say what, 30-40 miles.

BROWN: About that.

MUMMERT: And so when you're talking, and also Norris Dam is a high 00:17:00dam that's on the Clinch River that's--uh--north of Knoxville about 25-30 miles. And--uh--they both--both Douglas Dam and Norris Dam where they are located, even though they're on different rivers, they would affect the flow of river--the--of water in the Tennessee River, which begins in Knoxville. And--uh--when you were talking about flooding in Chattanooga and trying to avoid a serious problem there, that--uh--we're talking about a location or a city that's I think 150 miles south--or downstream from--from Knoxville. So we're talking--the--the scale of this is--is--uh--s--quite sizable, too, geographically. --And--uh--that's one thing that always--uh-- always got--i--impressed 00:18:00me about TVA--uh--the whole river system really--uh--controls an area or a watershed of about 40,000 or so square miles and--uh--some sizable tributary rivers coming out of--uh--East Tennessee, Southwest Virginia, Northern Georgia, Western North Carolina. And so when you have an issue like this in a new--relatively new river system of that's been built, it sounds like it must have been a scary thing to-to be in the middle of. Now, did I explain generally the features of the--of the river system and where these various dams are?

BROWN: You--you did a good job.

MUMMERT: Okay, well thank you. --Uh--you mentioned your--uh--rainfall gauge system in those days. What was that like, how did that work?

BROWN: We had r--uh--finally rain gauges that reported in by telephone, the amount of rain they had recorded at that spot on it. It was then placed on a--manually on a map of the whole Valley, like you said in--involving--some 40,000 square miles, as to how much rainfall had fallen in the last period of time.

MUMMERT: Ex--excuse me but these were--these were people that read the gra--the gauge?

BROWN: Initially they were people.

MUMMERT: But, not at this point?

BROWN: At this time a lot of them were reported by telephone on them. We developed a--a system, we had a group that worked on the technology on it. And they had f--effected a system where these gauges would record the rate of rainfall and the amount and report in ever so often on it. And then it was--it came into a central headquarters in Knoxville. Our branch was on 00:20:00Union Avenue then was placed on a map at least once a day. And that map was provided to me on my desk to make sure I could see what rainfall was involved over the last several hours on it. Later on, we developed a system where, depending on the rate of rainfall it would report in more frequently than that on it. We had a--our groups were available to be called in any time of the day or night. We had an s--understanding with the s--uh--the public safety officer that came around through the building ever so often, if he came in and saw certain amounts of rainfall had fallen, he'd call people, and they reported in immediately to take care of that job. We had a lot of field people that did a lot of work. You mentioned the whole system, whenever you get things like that, you have to call in people to operate the gates cause a lot of them are-- most all of them are manually operated, and they have to have 00:21:00people and cranes to lift them up. And you mentioned Chattanooga. Chattanooga was the focal point of the upstream dams in terms of trying to control floods. Then the lower part of the Valley the reigning of about four or five dams to control it down toward the Ohio River, controlling the Mississippi and the Ohio River floods. The time I mentioned about it, the river system was spilling a lot of water at each and every mainstream dam. I remember when we had a break on an earlier flood situation that Red Wagner wanted to see the dams in operation. He chartered a plane and said we could put several people on that. But, we flew down the Valley seeing all those gates operating, and some places down around Savannah, Tennessee, even with the dams, it looked like the Pacific Ocean, almost. A lot of land flooded. And a lot of the times, people had a 00:22:00hard time understanding why with all those dams they--they still got flooded. And we had some lawsuits at times about flooding people's land illegally.

MUMMERT: Now, the--the Tennessee River from the whole way from Knoxville and through Chattanooga and as it flows on to the Ohio River is about 650 miles long--. And you--m--you--and you mentioned Savannah, but that's a good distance downstream from Chattanooga. That's on the--uh--I guess the last or the lowest--uh--Kentucky--.

BROWN: It's on the up end of Kentucky Reservoir and it's just downstream from Pickwick Dam. And--uh--it's an area that's real flat, a lot of farmland, but it's an area where you release very much water from Pickwick Dam, it's going to flood a lot of land. And the rights that-- legal rights that TVA had 00:23:00to flood the land were very limited. And so at times it became a problem to convince people to prove to people the fact that TVA did not make the flood worse on it. We didn't--we didn't say we controlled it, we just said we did not make it worse on it. And--and that was a little hard for the landowner to understand. And that's easy to understand that. I went one time with Jim Sasser on a trip down there to meet with a bunch of farmers out on the--sat on bales of hay.

MUMMERT: This was a Senator--uh--from Tennessee.

BROWN: See--we picked him up in--in Memphis, flew to Savannah. On the way there, I tried to explain to him exactly why the land was flooded, and we couldn't do anything about it and why we didn't make the flood worse. When we got 00:24:00there, and the farmers were mad, mad, mad, it was hot weather sitting on the bales of hay, and I thought I had them--Sasser on my side, but he immediately said: "Mr. Brown, did you bring a checkbook, AND going to pay these people for the flooding on"? And--and I learned what politics would play versus the legality and also technicality because I thought he understood and--and agreed with me, but whenever he saw those mad farmers, he said: "How about paying for the damage they have incurred on it." So that's one of the reasons, I think I said earlier, I liked the engineering part of my job, but the politics of it at times I did not like at all on it.

MUMMERT: When--uh--I had been asking you some questions about what your work was like when you first started TVA, but then when-- uh--you got promoted 00:25:00and you--uh--worked up the ladder, your responsibilities--uh--became bigger, of course. The scope of the activities that you got involved with and maybe the issues you had to deal with were broader than when you were first hired at TVA--uh--. Did they--I would assume there were things b--beyond just flood control that you had to deal with.

BROWN: Definitely, toward the latter part of my tenure at TVA, we had several branches under the division that I headed. The River Operations Branch was one where flood control was handled mostly. We had a rather large group out at Norris called the Engineering Laboratory that worked on innovative ideas and projects, and so forth. We had a branch in Chattanooga, the Water Quality Branch that dealt with the water quality problems in the Valley in 00:26:00helping--trying to help improve water quality. We had a Field Operations Branch that dealt with getting information out of the field. And the other branch that I recall right now, is the Air Quality Branch, which dealt with air quality in the Tennessee Valley both caused by TVA steam plants and by other facilities. So, in the end the operation was quite a bit different than just flood control but with a lot of daily operational things on it and--.

MUMMERT: Well, let's take one at a time, take--let's take the Engineering Lab. --Uh--what were some of those--uh--types of ideas or creative things they used to work on? I know there were probably many, many but if you could mention a few that pop up in your mind, that'd be great.

BROWN: One of the ones that--that pops into up in my mind, it's surprising the amount of effort it took to develop a little small dam weir, 00:27:00downstream from Norris Dam that would keep a flow in the river going after Norris was shut off, and the power generators would come on and then they'd shut off. The river would almost run dry, the fisheries resource was adversely affected. And we spent a lot of time developing a little dam that would control the release of water from a small pond downstream of Norris Dam on downstream to keep the fisheries going. The difficult part of that was there was always a chance somebody would be fishing upstream of that weir in a boat, and if they went over that little weir and they got in a roll, and it usually meant they would be drowned. So we had to develop a--a little dam that they--when they went over it, they could safely go over it and would not be drowned on it. --Uh--other projects we did, we had some that developed a system whereby you could--uh--inject sound waves into m--material and find out if it was 00:28:00about to fail. This was useful in turbines so turbine blades fail sometime, and you didn't know they were going to fail. But, we developed a system on that on it. Any kind of unusual project on it--uh--. Another thing it was always a--a matter of how you can have--uh--locks at dams and tows go in and out and not be affected adversely. We worked on improving the entranceways into the dams and out of the dams. One of the most interesting parts I think about happened--think about was the importance of cold water in Norris Reservoir. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant has a limitation on how well--how much it can operate power wise.

MUMMERT: And, excuse me for interrupting, but Sequoyah is 00:29:00just--uh--north of Chattanooga and--uh--how far downstream from Norris about? More than 100 miles for sure?

BROWN: About 100 miles, probably about 150 miles or so.

MUMMERT: So you're talking about the nuclear plant having some limitations in certain kinds of conditions.

BROWN: Sequoyah is built on an area of--of Chickamauga Reservoir that's sort of like an underwater pond. It draws cooling water from that underwater pond. If that cooling water got above a certain temperature, the load on the--nuclear plant had to be reduced. And so it was a very important thing to be able to decide when to begin to release that cold water out of the bottom of Norris Dam and have it arrive many miles downstream in a timely manner so that the nuclear plant could still maintain its peak. And--and that was one of 00:30:00the things that that group did was help determine how you would move that block of cold water downstream and get it there at the time you wanted it to and not waste it because it was very valuable, very valuable on it. And the--.

MUMMERT: Well I--uh--stayed around TVA after you retired for another decade or two, and I know that they continued to use that technique quite a number of times.

BROWN: Oh, did they?

MUMMERT: Yes, and also--uh--they're probably getting better at it.

BROWN: I would assume so on it but--.

MUMMERT: And you couldn't do--you couldn't do something like that--I think it's important to point out--in any other river system or river in the United States because there wouldn't be the--uh--controls given by the dams.

BROWN: There's probably no way on Earth that you would have a nuclear plant like that that has that limitation and then have the cold water with 00:31:00all of its value many miles upstream and decide how to use it without wasting it. And--um--I'm pleased to hear it's still a--a matter of operation on it. And that was one of things we developed, the system of being able to, we called it, route the water downstream from one dam to the next dam to the next dam. It had to go through Watts Bar, and Chickamauga on out--and--through--uh--Melton Hill on its p--process of going down to Chattanooga.

MUMMERT: But the--uh--Engineering laboratory could actually model those kinds of things before it actually happened right?

BROWN: Right, they had a lot of technical capability. The staff of the Engineering laboratory was probably m--more highly educated than any other bunch. In fact their education level, a lot of them had doctor's 00:32:00degree, which I did not have, a Ph.D degrees on it. But they were very skilled, they were at times hard people to control cause they wanted to march to their own drummer and don't--didn't want people interfering with what they were trying to do, but--uh--very skilled bunch on it. That's just one of the b--branches of the division on it.

MUMMERT: I heard or maybe read somewhere that the--uh--cooling water at Sequoyah, the amount was something like a million gallons a minute. I don't know whether you know.

BROWN: I don't remember the number. But it--it--it--.

MUMMERT: It was an amazing amount of water.

BROWN: Not only is it large quantities the temperature was very important on the cooling water.

MUMMERT: That would be the amount would be also discharged--

BROWN: Yeah, and it--the pond of water that you wouldn't realize is out there was used c--cooling and--and it would also be used for emergency purposes if--if the project had to be shut down because of some 00:33:00unex--unanticipated thing on it but.

MUMMERT: Well, that takes care of the--the Engineering Laboratory. You mentioned--uh--what else, water quality. --Uh--of course, what you just talked about is an aspect of water quality I guess because that's--would be thermal pollution that would be coming from the nuclear plant. But--uh--what other kinds of water quality issues did you have to deal with in your job? Quite a variety, I bet.

BROWN: Before I answer that question real specifically, it's interesting that you pointed out that what we talked about the Engineering Laboratory was a water quality problem on it. One of the difficulties I had at times was deciding whether or not a job was be assigned to the Engineering Lab or the Water Quality because they weren't entirely separable. And the two branches 00:34:00sometimes wanted this work, or didn't want that work on, so that was a sort of difficult situation. And I can recall one time that they had a problem and I told them you sit down and solve who does what. If not, I'm going to make a decision, and t--neither one of you'll like it. I--I threatened them with that and they worked it out. The main thing the Water Quality Branch in Chattanooga did other than some of the things we mentioned was to help try to improve the operation of water treatment systems by private concerns doing whatever could be done to improve the water quality of the whole Tennessee Valley on it. And so they--their work to a large degree was working with public outfits on water quality, and so forth on it. Plus they helped with the water quality issues in TVA on it.

MUMMERT: So you mean--uh--like--uh--municipal wastewater or sewage treatment--?

BROWN: Municipal wastewater and treatment on it--it. Make sure the design was good, they would if the operating systems was good and what could they do to improve it and all. Anything that would help with the overall water quality of the whole river system on it. And--uh--it was a branch that did a great job in that. They also helped when--uh--environmental statements that had to be prepared for projects later on, they did the analysis on what affects that project might have on water quality and everything like that on it. So, that was a big part of their work.

MUMMERT: Well are there any other--uh--in--in terms of water quality, there were--um--obviously discharges from wastewater plants obviously would 00:36:00be one source of a potential problem I guess that would affect river water quality. --Uh--what about any other types of--uh--water pollution issues you may have had to deal with--uh--?

BROWN: One--one of the things we had to deal--.

MUMMERT: Maybe there weren't any!

BROWN: There were no. Well, maybe recording them may be difficult after this long. But one of the things we had to deal with was when new plants were planned in the Valley new--um--fossil plants or whatever on it. T--trying to make sure that release from that plant met water quality standards before the plant got approval for discharging in the river system. A section of the TVA Act, that I can't quote it exactly, it's 26A, gave TVA the power to control all 00:37:00aspects that related to water quality and everything in the Valley. That was used frequently sometimes to tell people you gotta change your way or we aren't going to approve your project on it. We were always a little bit afraid that somebody was going to sue TVA over it and the project would be declared-- 26A would be declared illegal because it was so broad an interpretation. But, that was used a lot by Water Quality--uh--people and others to say we're not going to approve what you are going to do because it affects a stream in the Valley. And that--v--that streams are made up of a whole other thing on it. So, we did a lot of analyzing plants like in--a lot of them in Kentucky Reservoir and others along the river system, Guntersville and others for that discharge to make sure it was compatible with good--god treatment procedures before it 00:38:00entered the river on it.

MUMMERT: So--uh--as you talked, I was thinking another aspect of this is that you had to work closely with the states, when you got into these kinds of areas of wastewater regulation. Did--uh--TVA have a pretty good relationship with the states when it came to water quality?

BROWN: We had a great relationship it seemed, with--in terms of water quality. We tried to maintain politically that relationship for sure because it was a help both ways on it. --Uh--one time I was awarded--uh--TVA Conservationist of the Year by the Tennessee Conservation League, which is--uh--a private organization of members on it. They really wanted to award it to the division because of what work it had done, but they--it had to be to a person, so I got the honor, but it was the work of the division in improving water 00:39:00quality. The prime thing on that was, downstream from dams we constructed different methods of re--aerating the water as soon as it went through the dam or after it left the dam so that the fisheries downstream the water quality would be--uh--scceptable. Some places we built weirs. Douglas Dam, the last I knew, we were injecting oxygen upstream of the dam into the water so that the water downstream would have the necessary oxygen for life on it. Reservoirs stratify at certain times of the year and certain times of the year the water is very low on oxygen, and so unless you do something to reoxidize the water, change the water quality or the water going through the dam, the fisheries resource downstream from the dam would be ruined on it.

MUMMERT: Alright, let's jump to another branch, Air Quality. Now, Air 00:40:00Quality, TVA's involvement in Air Quality would that have something to do with it getting into the business of fossil and coal plants? --I wouldn't think TVA would have had an Air Branch before that time.

BROWN: Very much involved in that. Some of the things we did then now are not acceptable anymore. But one of the things we worked a lot on was how high do you have to put the pollution in the air from a--fossil plant so that it doesn't come down right around the plant but comes down somewhere else on it. And the plants then resulted in the high stacks like at Kingston Steam Plant and everything like that. But we--that branch modeled--uh--the quality of the air leaving the ducts from the steam plants into where it went in the air 00:41:00and how much came down and everything. A really interesting sideline project, we planted white pines around Kingston Steam Plant because they are very good indicators of whether the air is good or not in it. And we monitored whether those white pines lived or died around the plant. As it became known later, that technique doesn't ap--work anymore and that something has to be done at the power plant itself. A--again, we worked with industries that to make sure that their release from their plant into the air met air quality standards and everything like that on it. At one time the Air Quality Branch did forecasting of weather for TVA, but later that was contracted out on it. But--uh--that branch was located in Muscle Shoals, but it was under the--the headquarters here in Knoxville on it.

MUMMERT: I wanted to mention too that, when--we've been talking about water quality and air quality. --Uh--you--there was a lot more emphasis put on--uh--those two subjects because of federal legislation at the time in the early 1970s with the Clean Water Bill and I--and the Air Quality Bill, is that right? And they probably both helped and hurt TVA in different ways.

BROWN: Yes and--uh--. Well like I--well--like I said the technique that TVA used to meet the air quality especially standards around plants, later on was not an acceptable technique today, and so things are quite different then only. But, the idea was put it high enough up in the air and it won't affect right around the plant or nearby and it'll-it'll come down in less quantities 00:43:00somewhere else. And of course, it affects, to a small degree, the--the--uh--Great Smoky Mountain National Park, it effects cities downwind from TVA plants and everything like that on it. But so, that aspect of TVA changed radically over time because of legislation and court procedures on it and everything like that.

MUMMERT: --Uh--other than--we--we covered the Engineering Lab, Air Branch, Water Quality Branch. I'm missing one I think that you mentioned. Or maybe more than one.

BROWN: Well, one of them was the--uh--what we called the Hydraulic Data Branch. They were the field people that went out and gathered whatever data we needed for whatever we doing out into the field. They read stre--they went by stream gauges and read them sometimes and called them in every day. They we--sometimes the rainfall gauges and called them in. They did whatever we did-- 00:44:00needed in terms of getting the information from the field into the headquarters to do whatever was necessary on it. One other group I'll mention real quickly is a staff group that worked long and hard on developing a very elaborate computer program to determine where was the most efficient place that--for TVA to meet its power loads at that particular moment. Whether at a dam, steam plant and at a particular dam, which turbines under certain conditions would be the best to use for the most efficient operation of the system. And they developed a very elaborate p-program, I don't whether it's still in used or not. Something else probably has developed. But, in order to help most efficiently use the fossil fuel, the dams and the turbines--uh--gas turbines to meet the power load on it. They worked years on that--on it and did a good job.

MUMMERT: Now, how would something like that work after they do a lot 00:45:00of research--and--they'd have to somehow communicate that into some guidelines that are used?

BROWN: That--that particular thing was financed primarily by the power funds--operation of the power system. After it was developed into a useful piece of equipment, in this case a computer program, it was turned over to the power people that determined which places to place the power load. So we--we--we were not in the Office of Power, but they financed it--the work. And then we turned it over to them when it was operational, and then we kept trying to improve it and do it--the job better. So, that's the way it was placed into operation.

MUMMERT: Now, about when chronologically, was that, in the 1970s maybe or later or?

BROWN: It was more--nearly later on in the 1980s, and so forth. And I 00:46:00guess it ended pretty soon after I left TVA in--uh--1980. I don't know what much has done about it since then on it. The group now has been--uh--disband on it and most all the people have gone somewhere else or retired on it.

MUMMERT: The--uh--I think--uh--looking at your resume; I saw too that you were Director or involved in--uh--Deputy Director of Office of Natural Resources. --Is that what we've been talking about or is there more there than?

BROWN: Well--we talked around that on it. After I was here in Knoxville, much to my surprise, I g--received a call from my supervisor one 00:47:00Saturday morning and said: "Bevan, you're gonna be promoted." And I thought well, that was good in a way, but I wasn't looking for a promotion. And you'll be transferred to Chattanooga to head up a division in Chattanooga. Well--the--Environmental Quality Branch, I believe it was called. I didn't like the idea at all, I told my supervisor I said: "I ain't looking for another job. I like the job I've got right now. What options do I have"? He said: "Bevan, I don't think you have any other options." And so off to Chattanooga I went and headed up that branch, which was left over from a person leaving TVA. And I wasn't given any instructions by the board or anything what they wanted me to do. I--I when I think back on it, I don't know. But anyhow, then 00:48:00later on I was transferred from there to head up the Deputy Director of the Office of Natural Resources in--headquartered Norris then. And I guess I don't know where it is now. And that involved the--uh--Forestry Divisions and a lot of other bunches I can't think of right now--on it. I hate to admit it, but that didn't work out well. My supervisor and I were two different people, entirely two different people and we just did not pull together on it. And it became obvious that somebody had to--to go--leave on it. And I was approached by the Assistant General Manager Dave [Sherrod] about the problem, and I offered to come back to Knoxville as head of the--a division if they would bring 00:49:00me back at the grade I had then and the salary and that would relieve the problem in Norris, they thought. And they took me up on that proposition, and much to my pleasure, cause I was much happier back as Director of the Division Water and Air Resources than I was working in the circumstances that I didn't feel like I was adding anything positive to the functioning of the group. It ended up, a lot of people sort of seemed to be on my side, and a lot of people seemed to be on the--the manager's side and so therefore that won't work in a large group. I think we had over 1,000 employees in that bunch. And--uh--the solution seemed to be well--pleasing to the TVA General Manager Bill Willis then. And I came back for the latter part of my tenure in Knoxville, which I enjoyed an awful lot.

MUMMERT: In the end or end of your career at TVA, was involved basically as the head of the Air and Water Division?

BROWN: Yes, it was--I was classified as Director of Air and Water Resources, on as Division Director.

MUMMERT: You saw a lot of changes in those fields through your career at TVA? Can you talk about a few?

BROWN: My changes where now?

MUMMERT: Changes. Maybe technological changes--uh--how--.

BROWN: --Uh--staffing changes--uh--. The number of people in the staff. One of the changes I've s--seen--uh--witnessed that I just can't conceive how it is now. I was clamitized to a Board of Directors composed of three people and a General Manager and an operation of decision-making where the Board was available almost daily and involved in daily decision-making. Til, 00:51:00the top management of the agency now is beyond my comprehension of with--the current nine-member I guess board and their method of operation. So that's one change I just and to--s--to some degree people's changing titles and everything. The former titles are not used. So that--that changed and the--.

MUMMERT: But, fortunately for you, that all change happened after you left.

BROWN: After I left, cause I--if it had happened while I was there, I don't whether I'd been able to move with the current or not. The other great big change that occurred, all of the things that were sort of dear to my heart in my career at TVA, Water Quality Air Quality and everything like that, was funded primarily by appropriated money with a combination, some coming from 00:52:00the Office of Power, joint funding. Now--.

MUMMERT: Appropriated means appropriated by the U.S. Congress.

BROWN: Yup, right. And as I understand it now, TVA does not get any appropriated money from Congress--on it--.

MUMMERT: That's correct.

BROWN: And so things that were funded by appropriated money from Congress have been discontinued, either turned over to the state or decided we don't need to do them and everything like that.

MUMMERT: And some a--a limited number are funded by the power proceeds.

BROWN: Right, well we had a limited--we had a limited number then funded by power; some like the Reservoir Operations, it was jointly funded by power and appropriations and some other things were. Air Quality and--and other work we did but for the Office of Power. But, that to me when I think about it the fact that what--I what I really sort of-- I devoted my whole career to and 00:53:00proud of now doesn't exist in TVA almost and on it. And I--I would have had a hard--I don't know--well I guess I would have been eliminated, I would have been said we have enough of you, get out the door on it.

MUMMERT: Or they might have found a new job for you,

BROWN: That's wishful thinking maybe.

MUMMERT: That would not have been in the area you're best--uh--best trained for.

BROWN: It'd of been a political job, probably and I'd--of g--I'd--of I'd of have said: "Thank you, goodbye." on it and so forth on it. And--uh--that--uh--that's a big change on it. I left TVA a little bit under--little bit of stress. But, it was ideal when I left. For the maybe record, I was offered a retirement deal that I could not refuse. Circumstance was a little bit odd. I got a call from Chili Dean[2] saying he was sort of heard 00:54:00about it. He said: "Why don't you sue them?" And I said: "I'm afraid I'd win." He said: "Well, what's wrong with that?" I said: "What could be worse than working in an environment where they don't want you anymore?" And I walked out the door with a great retirement option. A little before I had planned to retire, but it worked out extremely well. I continued to do some engineering work in foreign countries, some locally and had a great retirement since then on it. But back to the question, that's the two biggest things I can think of. And--along with that, perhaps, is the fact that my work with TVA I got to work with so many people that were so helpful, so concerned, so skilled and such a family affair, til that would have been dissolved, and I don't know whether it's like that now or not. I keep seeing in the paper about more and more 00:55:00people gone, more and more work being contracted. And--uh--I just can't conceive of that in a way on it.

MUMMERT: Well, looking back on your career at TVA--uh--. Here's a tough question for you: what would you consider to be one of your major accomplishments? Or how would you phrase that answer?

BROWN: I don't know how I would phrase that answer in a way, on it. I--I think I was judged to have done a real good job because I got promoted to higher positions on it. I--uh--accomplished a lot of things in getting things more--uh--operational for the days' environment. And I guess my biggest accomplishment, when I think back on it; it wasn't so much my capability in a lot of areas, but my luck or maybe capability to have people on hand 00:56:00that could take of so many things on it. I remember one occasion with John Waters,[3] when a fellow was asking him some real technical questions, and John says: "Hey, Bevan Brown's back there, and he'll--he knows the answer." I didn't know the answer either, but I knew I had people that worked for me that knew the answer, but Waters didn't fully understand that on it. I had one circumstance that unbelievable in a way on it. We were in Washington for a Congressional hearing. Chili Dean[4] was on the spot, they asked him a water quality type problem on fisheries, catfish in Kentucky Dam.[5] He said: "We've got Bevan Brown back here in the back, and he can answer that question." Well, the unusual part on it, Bevan Brown wasn't next in line to be asked that question. He just jumped over some people because he knew me. I had to go sit at the table and answer some of the Congressional questions 00:57:00on why unusually the catfish being caught in Kentucky Dam[6] had bad-looking flesh and was not marketable. And a lot of trouble was being caused by that, and was--was accused of TVA having something to do with it. Rather unusually, we thought it was everything imaginable, but it turned out to be the technique the catfish farmers had started using to slaughter, kill the catfish. They electrocuted them. And when they electrocuted them, the current changed the texture and the color of the white catfish meat on it. And we finally found the answer. But anyhow, that was--uh--and Jim Sasser put in a special appropriations in our--uh--appropriations for us to have more money to find the answer 00:58:00on that on it. TVA didn't move the money like they told Sasser they was, but that's the way everything worked. And I don't know w--if he would have cared anyhow, but anyhow he said I did it, and TVA solved the problem on it.

MUMMERT: And they couldn't blame that one on TVA.

BROWN: No, I didn't turn out to be. That--that was very interesting. We didn't know whether it was the f--f--uh--farming practices around Kentucky Reservoir, and the fertilizer getting into the reservoir. We didn't know whether it was some small, real bad chemical being released by some of the plants at Johnsonville or what. It was a total loss to start with as to what had happened all of a sudden. And it was all kinds of possibilities, but it turned out to be one we never dreamed about on it and--uh--. And so that was a very interesting aspect of it. But, all those kind of things when I think back on them, I am proud of my career there. I did the best I could and I apparently was 00:59:00rewarded, I thought, generously for that, and I don't have any regrets of not leaving TVA when I was offered another job on it and--with the Corps of Engineers on--.

MUMMERT: Well, it sounds like there was a--you and--uh--TVA were a good match. And--uh--you had a very--most--most interesting career. But also I--I'm a bit younger than you are and I know that you have high respect among a lot of people at TVA even today that knew you--know you. I'm going to--uh--get near the end of the interview here, but I--I have--on--I'll let you say whatever you want to but, I have one question. And this is probably the difficult--most difficult question. --Uh--are there any questions I have not asked that you wish I had?

BROWN: That in--on the spur of the moment, it's real difficult on it. I thought about--when I was thinking about this interview, and things I 01:00:00had. I saw a circumstance and was part of it. One Saturday, morning in the TVA board room on in--in the Sprankle Building on Union Avenue, we'd had a face-off with the Corps of Engineers who we recorded we--uh--rec--the operation of Kentucky Reservoirs, coordinated with them. They issued orders that we exceed our right to flood some land in the Kentucky Reservoir. The land rights in Kentucky are very complex. We refused to do it. The reason for doing it, according to the Corps, was to save some flooding along the Mississippi River, of farmers along the Mississippi River. That was reported to the Mississippi River Commission, who governed what happened on the Mississippi River. The Corps of Engineers flew a planeload of Generals into Knoxville on 01:01:00a Saturday, and we met in the boardroom. And the Generals told Red Wagner, and I don't remember if there was any board members other than him there or not, that they were ordering him to order us to do what the Corps said to do to, to save the farmers on the Mississippi River. We had a little sideline meeting there Bob Marquis was the General Counsel, I and my supervisor and the operation of the River Control Branch was there. And Wagner listened to all of the pluses and minuses, and the brief time we went back into the room with the Generals then Wagner said: "We're not going to do it." To see the expression on those Generals' face was unbelievable. They looked at each other, did you hear it, he's said he's going to disobey us. And we--he said they will take 01:02:00this to Washington and to see if a lawsuit can be filed and everything. But, that was an unusual experience, and I remember I to this day in detail that Wagner said: "No we're not on it." And we did not flood some land in Kentucky Reservoir to save some flooding on the Mississippi River. That leads me to one thought. As a result, thereof I was assigned the responsibility to coordinate with the C--Corps of Engineers in the Ohio River Division to develop a Memorandum of Understanding so we wouldn't have that face-off again. We worked long and hard and f--finally developed a Memorandum of Understanding that said when we would and would not violate the land rights in Kentucky Reservoir. I wonder to this day whether anybody ever knows--uh--where that Memorandum of Understanding or that has been lost forever. It has never been needed since then, but it might be needed again today. In the end, we said we'd 01:03:00only flood land in the Kentucky Reservoir to save the dike on the Mississippi River floodway from being blown up and a lot of land flooded. But, otherwise we would not violate the land's rights in the Kentucky Reservoir on it. But, I don't know what exactly led me to think about that, but I can remember to this day Red Wagner telling those generals, no we're not going to obey your orders. We gonna do what Bevan and his group says what we should do and the shock on their--their faces on it.

MUMMERT: I didn't know of--anything about that, but I do know, I guess that occasionally--uh--TVA can just shut the flow of the Tennessee River--uh--can it not. When--uh--there is--uh--excessive flooding on the Mississippi or--or the Ohio?

BROWN: It can un--but there's an uncontrolled canal between Barkley 01:04:00(Lake) on the--uh--Cumberland River and Kentucky (Lake) on the Tennessee River, and so whatever you do in Kentucky affects the Cumberland and the Cumberland affects the Kentucky on it--Reservoir on it. The land rights I'm thinking about, is we only have rights to go above 365' 10 feet below the top of the gates for 12 months of the year, for 6 months of the year, we can go on up to 375'. And so it was a violation of that ten time factor on it. And it was to save some farmers that were farming land along the Mississippi River at their own risk. And so TVA took sort of dim view of flooding. --Uh--the Corps of Engineers said we--if you sued and lose, we'll reimburse TVA for your losses. --Uh--Bob Marquis said: "No, that won't, cause we can't be guaranteed you could do 01:05:00that." And so that was rejected on it. But that was just a little small incident, it will never be wiped from my mind on it. W--Wagner said no on it.

MUMMERT: It kind of place--puts an explanation point on--uh--some of the historical disagreements between TVA and the Corps of Engineers.

BROWN: To a degree we--we--we had some disagreements--uh--made me think of another one one time. Much smaller, but I'm proud of. The park down at Guntersville where the--uh--retirees' annual get-together at Guntersville Reservoir is on a piece of a park land down there.

MUMMERT: And Guntersville is in northern--northern Alabama.

BROWN: Right. And--uh--when that park idea was being developed, the City of Guntersville had to come up with about $200,000 dollars, as I recall, 01:06:00to pay their share, and the Corps was going to prepare the park. Maybe a little bit illegally, we came up with an idea. We gave the Guntersville--the City of Guntersville $200,000 dollars not doing very much work, and they took that money and matched it with the Corps of Engineers. Which, I got a call from one of the Corps of Engineers' men and said: "Don't you know that's illegal? They were supposed to come up with private money to match, and that's government money matching government money, and they're not doing what the contract says." I can't remember exactly how I handled it, but--uh--the General Counsel's Office had sort of said well it would be okay on it. But anyhow, I sort of said: "Oh no, they're not going to that, they've done something out here torn down a barn and we gave them $200,000 dollars for tearing down a barn. But, every time the annual--uh--picnic is held at Guntersville, I think about the fact 01:07:00that that park area, as I recall, was the result of coming up with $200,000 dollars for the City of Guntersville not to do much work, in turn was used to match the funding they need for the Corps to build that park on it. Not the only thing I did a little bit ill-illegally, maybe but sometimes you had to push the envelope pretty far. One quick thing, when Sequoyah was being built, there was a small--uh--water supply company there, they were in the way. And we tried to move them, and everything like that. And it finally came down that they would sign off on everything if we gave them a backhoe. I was approached by one of the attorneys, Leonard Smith, and came up with a backhoe. And I--through my division I gave them a backhoe, they signed off on Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. When I retired, Leonard Smith gave me a little--small backhoe, as a memento 01:08:00and I still have that backhoe cause of the fact that I had stretched the law in order for Sequoyah to gets its approval on it--. That's a very interesting things happened on it, very interesting people.

MUMMERT: But of course, TVA had some flexibility to get things done. That's the way I would say that.

BROWN: Well. Well, we found flexibility. It's--uh--since I left, the operation of the reservoir system is a lot more devoted to other things than flood control, navigation and power. When I was there, if it didn't fit those three things, operation of the system for flood control, navigation and it's consistent with that to generate power, it was awfully--could not be done. But, I've noticed lately, and I'm glad of that, that the General Counsel's Offices has said well, maybe we can do a little bit of this and do a little bit of that for--to help with the water quality and things like that on it. So, 01:09:00some of that's still being done on it. And--uh--lot depends on who's head of the General Counsel Offices and legal opinions and things can change with time on it. We had another one--.

MUMMERT: Well, there are a lot more demands, too, on the river system, I--I mean the--primarily the growth of the population and industry, means that there--there has to be more done.

BROWN: And pub--public interest and everything like that. But, I remember one time Chili Dean[7] called me up directly and said: "Bevan, doesn't this violate flood control and navigation"? And I said: "Yeah." And I--I said: " But we're not going to operate a difference unless the law has changed" and so Chili[8] --but things changed on it. --Uh--a small thing, on it, for a long time, we wanted to put horns on the downstream of dams so whenever the--the--r--turbines were going to be cut on, fish--people and everything in boats would be warned. For a long time, the General Counsel's Office would not approve that. They said suppose the horns failed and everything like that on it. I think now they have some 01:10:00sort of warning system which was badly needed, whenever those turbines were going to come on right downstream from the dam on it. I don't know what I've left out. The only thing I've left out, I worked with some very unusual people, very odd and--and--. I this--I don't know about this one--I worked with one individual if it had been in today's climate, I would have been concerned that he would have shown up for work with a gun and shot somebody cause he felt he was persecuted because of him being biracial, and things he could believe and do was unbelievable. He would go out at lunch time and if a helicopter flew over, he said the FBI was following him. He went over to the FBI office several times and knocked on the door and wanted to see the file that they had on him. He filed a grievance about people using his trash can instead of their 01:11:00own trash can at one time. He filed a grievance about people slamming their desk drawer to irritate him. And finally he--we were going to try to get him some help, and he was going to talk to our personnel officer, and when he got in the office, he looked up above and saw something he thought was a recording device, and he wouldn't say a word. But anyhow, that shows you how things have changed. I think about that lots of time, and if that had been today, I would have been extremely nervous that he might have just walked in one day cause he was very unbalanced--very unbalanced on it. And--uh--I don't know whether that's part of worthwhile information or not on it.

MUMMERT: Well--uh--it's part of being a manager over a lot of different people.

BROWN: Yes, that's right. It was a lot of different people. I--I had some strange ones, one that would go to the head, and wash his hands and bring the towels back and dry them and use them again. He rolled up his adding machine tape paper backwards and used it for scratch paper. And things like 01:12:00that on it. But, there was only one of him, and he was very unusual--very unusual. --Uh--since he's deceased, I can say his name was Bruce Whitlock.

MUMMERT: Well, I--uh--can't come up with any other questions for you, but I appreciate the time that you spent. And it's been very interesting.

BROWN: I appreciate the opportunity, it's caused me to, in advance, to think about a lot of things in my work at TVA and--and--uh--my joy with my accomplishments. If not to brag, but also with my satisfaction of having spent all 38 years of my life in TVA, and TVA giving me some other opportunities like to do some foreign work that helped me bridge the period from preretirement to after retirement on it. One job was to go to Mozambique one time. One 01:13:00trip there was enough for me on it. Incidentally, I called up Wagner who was my friend, they wanted me to come back for some reason and I never knew why, but I didn't want to go back. And so I got him to the--the United Nations who we were working for that I--my job was so busy at the moment I could not be spared to come back again. And Wagner sort of stretched the truth, there but he saved my neck from going back to Mozambique again on it. And I think I got credit for things that weren't my credit when I was in Mozambique. Mozambique was awarded $10 million dollars that happened to be while I was there and just happened to be while I had gone down to the Ambassador's office to report in that I was in Mozambique. And I believe the government thought I had something to do with that $10 million dollars, and that's the reason they wanted me to come back. And I had nothing to do with the government giving them $10 million dollars 01:14:00because of a drought.

MUMMERT: Well, that sounds like you should have gone back.

BROWN: What can you do to try to help a country that's in civil war? Whatever was good that was done at night was blown up by the rebels. Whatever was done in the daytime was blonde up at night by the rebels. What could you do for a country that had run all the Portuguese people out of the country, and that was all of their brain power? And the usual education was about the sixth grade, and what in the world can be done when that's the only technical capability they have. I couldn't find the answer on it to be honest with you.

MUMMERT: Well, yeah, I--especially for a water systems engineer from TVA.

BROWN: Yeah, well, I was--that's right. I was a US representative, and there were representatives from a lot of other foreign countries, including 01:15:00Russia. And--uh--we filed a report, but I don't think there's much in the report that would have really been helpful to them. I wrote the chapter on the need for education, but--uh--uh--I don't know whatever happened to that on it. At that time Mozambique, couldn't decide whether they wanted to be a democracy or a communistic bunch, they were leaning toward a communistic bunch. The Russian delegate there was put up in very nice facilities, for the--as Mozambique was concerned. The rooms other people had, our water went off about 6 or 7 o'clock in the morning, and you'd better have your tub full of water to dip out to flush your commode during the day, otherwise you wasn't going to have any water. And it was--it was pathetically poor--pathetically poor. The only jobs was people going over into the coal mines, diamond mines in South America[9] and working; but no resources other 01:16:00than cashew nuts and--and--uh--some fisheries in the country on it. No, I don't want to go back.

MUMMERT: Well, listen. Thank you very much again.

BROWN: I enjoyed it. It was a--been a pleasure that I did enjoy this much on it but it's obvious I love to talk. That's all I've got now.

MUMMERT: Well, thank you very much.

BROWN: You're quite welcome.