MUMMERT: The following--uh--is an oral history interview conducted as part of
the Tennessee Valley Authority Retirees Association Oral History Pilot Project.
The person being interviewed is Bevan Brown. Mr. Brown
is a retiree of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). He worked at the Tennessee
Valley Authority for 38 years between September 1950 and September 1988. He is
being interviewed by Philip Mummert as part of the Pilot Oral History Project.
The interview location is Christ--uh--United Methodist Church in Knoxville,
Tennessee. And today is Thursday, July 14th 2016. --Uh--the interview is now
beginning. --Uh--Mr. Brown--uh--let me begin by asking you if you could describe
very briefly for me the circumstances that--uh--led you to becoming
00:01:00employed at the Tennessee Valley Authority.
BROWN: Those circumstances are real easy to describe. I had just finished
college in a degree in hydraulics and hydrology, loved water. Got a call on the
farm where I lived from a branch chief interviewing me and asking me about the
possibility of a job. I was looking for a job like at TVA, and it didn't take me
long to express a lot of interest in that job. I got a telegram in a day or two
from a personnel officer offering me a job and off I came to Knoxville.
MUMMERT: And--uh--you stayed in Knoxville for more than 38 years?
BROWN: Well, I was transferred--uh--in about I guess, in about 1970-something to
Chattanooga for a year to take over a division there of environmental
00:02:00quality, or something like that was the name of it. I spent a year there, then I
was transferred out to Norris to be r--Tom Ripley Deputy Director in the Office
of Natural Resources. And then I was transferred back to Knoxville, where I
ended up retiring. So, but I spent most all my time in Knoxville.
MUMMERT: When you started, which was in 1950, what was your position or your job
at that time?
BROWN: I was classified as a Civil Engineer I, my pay was $3,200 a year. As a
sideline to a degree, my daddy thought I was an--a success to begin with. And I
found out my--later after he died that he never made as much as $3,200 a year.
So that amount of money made me a success in my hometown as far as my
00:03:00daddy was concerned. And s--that was the starting point of my initial time with TVA.
MUMMERT: Okay, and what sort of work did you do when you just--were just hired?
BROWN: When I was just hired, I worked in a branch called the--uh--uh--Flood
Control Branch, I believe at that time. And--uh--I did jobs like analyzing after
we'd had a flood how good a pr--decisions were made. I worked to improve the
process of doing that. I did whatever I was told to do to a degree, I asked to
do and did it to the best of my ability. And fortunately for me, I was promoted
up and moved up from it. When I first came to TVA, there were some people that I
considered to be almost like in a c--celestrial position, the division director,
and they were off in the wild blue yonder as far as I was concerned. And
to-- I never realized that someday I would be sitting in that position
00:04:00myself on it before I retired. So--uh--overall I was extremely pleased from my
early decision. I had an offer one time to leave TVA for a reason, I turned it
down. And I'm delighted that I turned it down.
MUMMERT: When you began in--at TVA in 1950--uh--TVA was about 17 years old,
itself. And--uh--if I'm correct, I think that most of or many of the dam
projects--uh--had been built. And you--when you came in, probably You
weren't--it--it was shortly after--uh--much of the whole controlled river system
had been built and needed to be operated. Was the--uh--the flood
00:05:00control projects that you worked on when you first started having to do with
trying to fine tune the--uh--the system of dams, or was it flooding in other
parts of the Valley or both?
BROWN: It was a little bit of both. --Uh--my job in the br--when I first came
was to monitor the decisions that had been made relative to operating the system
by the River Control Branch and to come up with ways that might have made a
better decision on the operation. You're right, I cannot think of a major dam
project that was constructed, maybe one up around Kingsport, Boone up there in
that industry was con--finished after I came. But all the projects essentially
in operation when I came, and so I was involved in the operational part after
the dams were built.
MUMMERT: How many--uh--people were doing work like you were doing at
00:06:00that point in time, app--approximately?
BROWN: The branch I was in probably had 20 people, very small. Branches were
fa--fairly small then on it. And--uh--composed of a manager person or two, some
engineers of different staff levels and a few engineering aides on it.
And--uh--and then things thereafter on it. One of the reasons we had a branch
called the Flood Control Branch surprisingly was Red Wagner's desire for TVA
always because it was one of his purposes was flood control, one was navigation
and one was power. He always insisted while he was there that there ought to be
a Flood Control Branch. Later after he left, the Flood Control Branch
00:07:00name was changed. And, but that was the reason of the existence of the branch
from the very beginning.
MUMMERT: Now, who was Red Wagner?
BROWN: Red Wagner was Chairman of the Board of TVA for many years and--and had a
lot to do with many, many different aspects of TVA at that time, including,
surprisingly, refusing that any TVA projects being built not be named for a
person but be named for something like the geographic region or something like
that on it. I always thought that was a great decision cause politics entered
into so much into naming dams and projects like the Corps of Engineers on it.
And---uh--that was one of the things that he did that I always remember about him.
MUMMERT: --Uh--can you give some examples or--uh--some stories about that?
BROWN: Well we, something said about earlier that all the dams had
00:08:00been completed. There's one or two that were done after I came here, on it--on
the Duck River and on at Normandy and others. And I believe there was a
Congressman by the name of Davis, I'm not sure, that felt people wanted a dam
named for him, and so forth on it. And Wagner stood his ground. Also, we were
looking one time for a steam plant site up in Kentucky, and they I think they
wanted it named for somebody in Kentucky, but Wagner would not budge on that
regardless of the politics involved on it.
MUMMERT: Now the--the flood--types of flood control work you did--uh--can you
give a specific example of what you might have run into in those days?
BROWN: Later, in those days, and especially later on, I was in--very much
involved into the day-to-day operation of the dams, primarily for flood control
but for power on it. --Uh--in the late--uh--1980s, we had a condition
00:09:00that I don't think's ever existed before then, and I don't think has existed
since then. We had a major, major flood co--consideration with the rainfall and
runfall that never had happened before. That we did not have data that showed
why or where it happened. And--uh--for about three days, everything was
extremely hectic. We ended up setting some goals at that time on operation of
the reservoir system like filling some dams higher than they had ever been
filled and releasing from like Douglas Dam twice as much water than it's
ever--has ever been released. And as it turned out, practically all of our goals
were fulfilled on it. One of the goals was operation of Norris Dam.
00:10:00We set a goal of not flooding Highway 33, where it crossed--uh--the Clinch
River. But we also set a goal not to flood the Clinton's water treatment plant
or its wastewater treatment plant. Both of those goals were obtained on it and
it was very interesting. Mentioning interesting things, during that operation
there were a lot of houseboats anchored just upstream from Norris Dam. It became
obvious we were going to have to open the gates and let a lot of water out of
Norris Dam to keep it from filling higher than we wanted it filled. We sent our
field people in contact of all those owners that we could contact. And I think
we contacted them all and told them they needed to move their houseboats cause
we weren't sure we opened the gates whether these houseboats were going to be
pulled over the reservoir top and destroyed. Some of them were not
00:11:00moved. I consulted with the General Counsel's office and was told if it was
deemed in my power that--that the gates had to be opened to go ahead and open
them and if the houseboats went over the reservoir, bad luck for the owner. As
it turned out the v--velocity of the water did not move any of the houseboats
and everything went extremely well. But we were faced so in a period of about
three days of operation like we'd never been faced before. I was supervisor of
the operation of dams then, and for about three days, the only sleep I got was
practically none. I only went to my apartment took a shower and came back to
work. I remember Dick Freeman, I had to report two or three times a
00:12:00day to the board on what was going on and how we were fairing. And obviously, it
showed on my face that I was just about worn out. After it was all over, Dave
said we've got to do something about having more people trained to help in the
cases like that. Well, you can't train people like that in a few days, and so it
was never needed before. But, I remember Dick saying we can't have people as
tired as Bevan is obviously when he reported to us on it.
MUMMERT: And the Freemans that you mentioned were board members, and this was
probably toward the end of the 1970s or early 1980s?
MUMMERT: When some--uh--when--when did you fir--when would you first have found
out in your own mind or realized that there was a critical situation? This was a
time before we really had the kind of computer technology we do
00:13:00today. --Um--did you have--uh--the field people tell you something or was it a
gut feeling or? Did you follow the--uh--rain patterns?
BROWN: It was a combination of all those things. We had field people, and
everything but in this particular case, for some re--and we had a lot of
st--uh--rainfall gauges all over the Valley to measure rainfall that reported in
at least daily. We had some stream gauges that reported in daily, but for some
reason upstream of Douglas Dam, all the rainfall was missed by all our gauging
systems. So it was quite a surprise to find Douglas filling up far faster than
anything we thought it could be. You're right, we did not have computers, a lot
of it was hand-ground process. I found out about the problem, I went home from
work and I got a call from subordinates said we got a problem, and I
00:14:00went right back to work then that night. And we did have a problem, things were
rather chaotic. And we sat down and established some goals and got organized and
went from there. As part of the job, I had then, I had to report to my
supervisor what was happening. I had the TVA operators get in touch with every
board member, and I reported to the board member and the General Manager what
all was going on and what was happening. I was instructed to contact the mayor
of Knoxville and the mayor of Chattanooga to tell them things might not be like
you hoped for them to be, but we just don't know. And I got a great reception
from both of the mayors. The mayor of Chattanooga, I remember, gave me a
person's name and told me to keep in contacting and him and he appreciated me
contacting them. As somewhat of a sideline, we did flood some property and homes
in Chattanooga before it was over with, we could not help that on it.
00:15:00The conditions in Knoxville wouldn't as bad as we thought they might be. And so
that worked out well on it. --Uh--we had to get some people into the design
division to find out how high we could fill Douglas Dam without the dam failing
cause we were going to fill it up higher than it had ever been under our plans.
And it was a busy, hectic time, and our telephones nearly rang-off, people
wanted to know what's going to happen at my house, what's going to happen at my
property and everything like that on it. And they wanted to talk to somebody
that could give them a good answer. The people that could give them a good
answer versus the people that were having to do the work, were the same people
and so we were really stressed to meet the situation. I don't believe a
condition like that's has ever existed before then, I'm sure, and I don't
believe a condition like that has existed since then. Sitting on the
00:16:00sideline, I sometimes wonder now what's going to happen now, everything has
changed, but it was--it was a great surprise, a big surprise for us. But at the
end I was so pleased that all of our goals were met and no violation of what we
had planned. And we minimized the damage that--that was caused, but there was
still very serious damage in Chattanooga on it.
MUMMERT: Now you've mentioned a couple of things. I want to jump back and ask
you about a couple of questions about something--a few things you mentioned.
Before we do that though, we probably for someone that's listening to
this--uh--we need to get some p--give some perspective--uh--. Douglas Dam is on
the r--French Broad River--uh--east of Knoxville I would say what, 30-40 miles.
BROWN: About that.
MUMMERT: And so when you're talking, and also Norris Dam is a high
00:17:00dam that's on the Clinch River that's--uh--north of Knoxville about 25-30 miles.
And--uh--they both--both Douglas Dam and Norris Dam where they are located, even
though they're on different rivers, they would affect the flow of river--the--of
water in the Tennessee River, which begins in Knoxville. And--uh--when you were
talking about flooding in Chattanooga and trying to avoid a serious problem
there, that--uh--we're talking about a location or a city that's I think 150
miles south--or downstream from--from Knoxville. So we're talking--the--the
scale of this is--is--uh--s--quite sizable, too, geographically.
--And--uh--that's one thing that always--uh-- always got--i--impressed
00:18:00me about TVA--uh--the whole river system really--uh--controls an area or a
watershed of about 40,000 or so square miles and--uh--some sizable tributary
rivers coming out of--uh--East Tennessee, Southwest Virginia, Northern Georgia,
Western North Carolina. And so when you have an issue like this in a
new--relatively new river system of that's been built, it sounds like it must
have been a scary thing to-to be in the middle of. Now, did I explain generally
the features of the--of the river system and where these various dams are?
BROWN: You--you did a good job.
MUMMERT: Okay, well thank you. --Uh--you mentioned your--uh--rainfall gauge
system in those days. What was that like, how did that work?
BROWN: We had r--uh--finally rain gauges that reported in by telephone, the
amount of rain they had recorded at that spot on it. It was then placed on
a--manually on a map of the whole Valley, like you said in--involving--some
40,000 square miles, as to how much rainfall had fallen in the last period of time.
MUMMERT: Ex--excuse me but these were--these were people that read the gra--the gauge?
BROWN: Initially they were people.
MUMMERT: But, not at this point?
BROWN: At this time a lot of them were reported by telephone on them. We
developed a--a system, we had a group that worked on the technology on it. And
they had f--effected a system where these gauges would record the rate of
rainfall and the amount and report in ever so often on it. And then it was--it
came into a central headquarters in Knoxville. Our branch was on
00:20:00Union Avenue then was placed on a map at least once a day. And that map was
provided to me on my desk to make sure I could see what rainfall was involved
over the last several hours on it. Later on, we developed a system where,
depending on the rate of rainfall it would report in more frequently than that
on it. We had a--our groups were available to be called in any time of the day
or night. We had an s--understanding with the s--uh--the public safety officer
that came around through the building ever so often, if he came in and saw
certain amounts of rainfall had fallen, he'd call people, and they reported in
immediately to take care of that job. We had a lot of field people that did a
lot of work. You mentioned the whole system, whenever you get things like that,
you have to call in people to operate the gates cause a lot of them
are-- most all of them are manually operated, and they have to have
00:21:00people and cranes to lift them up. And you mentioned Chattanooga. Chattanooga
was the focal point of the upstream dams in terms of trying to control floods.
Then the lower part of the Valley the reigning of about four or five dams to
control it down toward the Ohio River, controlling the Mississippi and the Ohio
River floods. The time I mentioned about it, the river system was spilling a lot
of water at each and every mainstream dam. I remember when we had a break on an
earlier flood situation that Red Wagner wanted to see the dams in operation. He
chartered a plane and said we could put several people on that. But, we flew
down the Valley seeing all those gates operating, and some places down around
Savannah, Tennessee, even with the dams, it looked like the Pacific Ocean,
almost. A lot of land flooded. And a lot of the times, people had a
00:22:00hard time understanding why with all those dams they--they still got flooded.
And we had some lawsuits at times about flooding people's land illegally.
MUMMERT: Now, the--the Tennessee River from the whole way from Knoxville and
through Chattanooga and as it flows on to the Ohio River is about 650 miles
long--. And you--m--you--and you mentioned Savannah, but that's a good distance
downstream from Chattanooga. That's on the--uh--I guess the last or the lowest--uh--Kentucky--.
BROWN: It's on the up end of Kentucky Reservoir and it's just downstream from
Pickwick Dam. And--uh--it's an area that's real flat, a lot of farmland, but
it's an area where you release very much water from Pickwick Dam, it's going to
flood a lot of land. And the rights that-- legal rights that TVA had
00:23:00to flood the land were very limited. And so at times it became a problem to
convince people to prove to people the fact that TVA did not make the flood
worse on it. We didn't--we didn't say we controlled it, we just said we did not
make it worse on it. And--and that was a little hard for the landowner to
understand. And that's easy to understand that. I went one time with Jim Sasser
on a trip down there to meet with a bunch of farmers out on the--sat on bales of hay.
MUMMERT: This was a Senator--uh--from Tennessee.
BROWN: See--we picked him up in--in Memphis, flew to Savannah. On the way there,
I tried to explain to him exactly why the land was flooded, and we couldn't do
anything about it and why we didn't make the flood worse. When we got
00:24:00there, and the farmers were mad, mad, mad, it was hot weather sitting on the
bales of hay, and I thought I had them--Sasser on my side, but he immediately
said: "Mr. Brown, did you bring a checkbook, AND going to pay these people for
the flooding on"? And--and I learned what politics would play versus the
legality and also technicality because I thought he understood and--and agreed
with me, but whenever he saw those mad farmers, he said: "How about paying for
the damage they have incurred on it." So that's one of the reasons, I think I
said earlier, I liked the engineering part of my job, but the politics of it at
times I did not like at all on it.
MUMMERT: When--uh--I had been asking you some questions about what your work was
like when you first started TVA, but then when-- uh--you got promoted
00:25:00and you--uh--worked up the ladder, your responsibilities--uh--became bigger, of
course. The scope of the activities that you got involved with and maybe the
issues you had to deal with were broader than when you were first hired at
TVA--uh--. Did they--I would assume there were things b--beyond just flood
control that you had to deal with.
BROWN: Definitely, toward the latter part of my tenure at TVA, we had several
branches under the division that I headed. The River Operations Branch was one
where flood control was handled mostly. We had a rather large group out at
Norris called the Engineering Laboratory that worked on innovative ideas and
projects, and so forth. We had a branch in Chattanooga, the Water Quality Branch
that dealt with the water quality problems in the Valley in
00:26:00helping--trying to help improve water quality. We had a Field Operations Branch
that dealt with getting information out of the field. And the other branch that
I recall right now, is the Air Quality Branch, which dealt with air quality in
the Tennessee Valley both caused by TVA steam plants and by other facilities.
So, in the end the operation was quite a bit different than just flood control
but with a lot of daily operational things on it and--.
MUMMERT: Well, let's take one at a time, take--let's take the Engineering Lab.
--Uh--what were some of those--uh--types of ideas or creative things they used
to work on? I know there were probably many, many but if you could mention a few
that pop up in your mind, that'd be great.
BROWN: One of the ones that--that pops into up in my mind, it's surprising the
amount of effort it took to develop a little small dam weir,
00:27:00downstream from Norris Dam that would keep a flow in the river going after
Norris was shut off, and the power generators would come on and then they'd shut
off. The river would almost run dry, the fisheries resource was adversely
affected. And we spent a lot of time developing a little dam that would control
the release of water from a small pond downstream of Norris Dam on downstream to
keep the fisheries going. The difficult part of that was there was always a
chance somebody would be fishing upstream of that weir in a boat, and if they
went over that little weir and they got in a roll, and it usually meant they
would be drowned. So we had to develop a--a little dam that they--when they went
over it, they could safely go over it and would not be drowned on it.
--Uh--other projects we did, we had some that developed a system whereby you
could--uh--inject sound waves into m--material and find out if it was
00:28:00about to fail. This was useful in turbines so turbine blades fail sometime, and
you didn't know they were going to fail. But, we developed a system on that on
it. Any kind of unusual project on it--uh--. Another thing it was always a--a
matter of how you can have--uh--locks at dams and tows go in and out and not be
affected adversely. We worked on improving the entranceways into the dams and
out of the dams. One of the most interesting parts I think about happened--think
about was the importance of cold water in Norris Reservoir. Sequoyah Nuclear
Plant has a limitation on how well--how much it can operate power wise.
MUMMERT: And, excuse me for interrupting, but Sequoyah is
00:29:00just--uh--north of Chattanooga and--uh--how far downstream from Norris about?
More than 100 miles for sure?
BROWN: About 100 miles, probably about 150 miles or so.
MUMMERT: So you're talking about the nuclear plant having some limitations in
certain kinds of conditions.
BROWN: Sequoyah is built on an area of--of Chickamauga Reservoir that's sort of
like an underwater pond. It draws cooling water from that underwater pond. If
that cooling water got above a certain temperature, the load on the--nuclear
plant had to be reduced. And so it was a very important thing to be able to
decide when to begin to release that cold water out of the bottom of Norris Dam
and have it arrive many miles downstream in a timely manner so that the
nuclear plant could still maintain its peak. And--and that was one of
00:30:00the things that that group did was help determine how you would move that block
of cold water downstream and get it there at the time you wanted it to and not
waste it because it was very valuable, very valuable on it. And the--.
MUMMERT: Well I--uh--stayed around TVA after you retired for another decade or
two, and I know that they continued to use that technique quite a number of times.
BROWN: Oh, did they?
MUMMERT: Yes, and also--uh--they're probably getting better at it.
BROWN: I would assume so on it but--.
MUMMERT: And you couldn't do--you couldn't do something like that--I think it's
important to point out--in any other river system or river in the United States
because there wouldn't be the--uh--controls given by the dams.
BROWN: There's probably no way on Earth that you would have a nuclear plant
like that that has that limitation and then have the cold water with
00:31:00all of its value many miles upstream and decide how to use it without wasting
it. And--um--I'm pleased to hear it's still a--a matter of operation on it. And
that was one of things we developed, the system of being able to, we called it,
route the water downstream from one dam to the next dam to the next dam. It had
to go through Watts Bar, and Chickamauga on out--and--through--uh--Melton Hill
on its p--process of going down to Chattanooga.
MUMMERT: But the--uh--Engineering laboratory could actually model those kinds of
things before it actually happened right?
BROWN: Right, they had a lot of technical capability. The staff of the
Engineering laboratory was probably m--more highly educated than any other
bunch. In fact their education level, a lot of them had doctor's
00:32:00degree, which I did not have, a Ph.D degrees on it. But they were very skilled,
they were at times hard people to control cause they wanted to march to their
own drummer and don't--didn't want people interfering with what they were trying
to do, but--uh--very skilled bunch on it. That's just one of the b--branches of
the division on it.
MUMMERT: I heard or maybe read somewhere that the--uh--cooling water at
Sequoyah, the amount was something like a million gallons a minute. I don't know
whether you know.
BROWN: I don't remember the number. But it--it--it--.
MUMMERT: It was an amazing amount of water.
BROWN: Not only is it large quantities the temperature was very important on the
MUMMERT: That would be the amount would be also discharged--
BROWN: Yeah, and it--the pond of water that you wouldn't realize is out there
was used c--cooling and--and it would also be used for emergency
purposes if--if the project had to be shut down because of some
00:33:00unex--unanticipated thing on it but.
MUMMERT: Well, that takes care of the--the Engineering Laboratory. You
mentioned--uh--what else, water quality. --Uh--of course, what you just talked
about is an aspect of water quality I guess because that's--would be thermal
pollution that would be coming from the nuclear plant. But--uh--what other kinds
of water quality issues did you have to deal with in your job? Quite a variety,
BROWN: Before I answer that question real specifically, it's interesting that
you pointed out that what we talked about the Engineering Laboratory was a water
quality problem on it. One of the difficulties I had at times was deciding
whether or not a job was be assigned to the Engineering Lab or the Water Quality
because they weren't entirely separable. And the two branches
00:34:00sometimes wanted this work, or didn't want that work on, so that was a sort of
difficult situation. And I can recall one time that they had a problem and I
told them you sit down and solve who does what. If not, I'm going to make a
decision, and t--neither one of you'll like it. I--I threatened them with that
and they worked it out. The main thing the Water Quality Branch in Chattanooga
did other than some of the things we mentioned was to help try to improve the
operation of water treatment systems by private concerns doing whatever could be
done to improve the water quality of the whole Tennessee Valley on it. And so
they--their work to a large degree was working with public outfits on water
quality, and so forth on it. Plus they helped with the water quality issues in
TVA on it.
MUMMERT: So you mean--uh--like--uh--municipal wastewater or sewage treatment--?
BROWN: Municipal wastewater and treatment on it--it. Make sure the design was
good, they would if the operating systems was good and what could they do to
improve it and all. Anything that would help with the overall water quality of
the whole river system on it. And--uh--it was a branch that did a great job in
that. They also helped when--uh--environmental statements that had to be
prepared for projects later on, they did the analysis on what affects that
project might have on water quality and everything like that on it. So, that was
a big part of their work.
MUMMERT: Well are there any other--uh--in--in terms of water quality, there
were--um--obviously discharges from wastewater plants obviously would
00:36:00be one source of a potential problem I guess that would affect river water
quality. --Uh--what about any other types of--uh--water pollution issues you may
have had to deal with--uh--?
BROWN: One--one of the things we had to deal--.
MUMMERT: Maybe there weren't any!
BROWN: There were no. Well, maybe recording them may be difficult after this
long. But one of the things we had to deal with was when new plants were planned
in the Valley new--um--fossil plants or whatever on it. T--trying to make sure
that release from that plant met water quality standards before the plant got
approval for discharging in the river system. A section of the TVA Act, that I
can't quote it exactly, it's 26A, gave TVA the power to control all
00:37:00aspects that related to water quality and everything in the Valley. That was
used frequently sometimes to tell people you gotta change your way or we aren't
going to approve your project on it. We were always a little bit afraid that
somebody was going to sue TVA over it and the project would be declared-- 26A
would be declared illegal because it was so broad an interpretation. But, that
was used a lot by Water Quality--uh--people and others to say we're not going to
approve what you are going to do because it affects a stream in the Valley. And
that--v--that streams are made up of a whole other thing on it. So, we did a lot
of analyzing plants like in--a lot of them in Kentucky Reservoir and others
along the river system, Guntersville and others for that discharge to make sure
it was compatible with good--god treatment procedures before it
00:38:00entered the river on it.
MUMMERT: So--uh--as you talked, I was thinking another aspect of this is that
you had to work closely with the states, when you got into these kinds of areas
of wastewater regulation. Did--uh--TVA have a pretty good relationship with the
states when it came to water quality?
BROWN: We had a great relationship it seemed, with--in terms of water quality.
We tried to maintain politically that relationship for sure because it was a
help both ways on it. --Uh--one time I was awarded--uh--TVA Conservationist of
the Year by the Tennessee Conservation League, which is--uh--a private
organization of members on it. They really wanted to award it to the division
because of what work it had done, but they--it had to be to a person, so I got
the honor, but it was the work of the division in improving water
00:39:00quality. The prime thing on that was, downstream from dams we constructed
different methods of re--aerating the water as soon as it went through the dam
or after it left the dam so that the fisheries downstream the water quality
would be--uh--scceptable. Some places we built weirs. Douglas Dam, the last I
knew, we were injecting oxygen upstream of the dam into the water so that the
water downstream would have the necessary oxygen for life on it. Reservoirs
stratify at certain times of the year and certain times of the year the water is
very low on oxygen, and so unless you do something to reoxidize the water,
change the water quality or the water going through the dam, the fisheries
resource downstream from the dam would be ruined on it.
MUMMERT: Alright, let's jump to another branch, Air Quality. Now, Air
00:40:00Quality, TVA's involvement in Air Quality would that have something to do with
it getting into the business of fossil and coal plants? --I wouldn't think TVA
would have had an Air Branch before that time.
BROWN: Very much involved in that. Some of the things we did then now are not
acceptable anymore. But one of the things we worked a lot on was how high do you
have to put the pollution in the air from a--fossil plant so that it doesn't
come down right around the plant but comes down somewhere else on it. And the
plants then resulted in the high stacks like at Kingston Steam Plant and
everything like that. But we--that branch modeled--uh--the quality of the air
leaving the ducts from the steam plants into where it went in the air
00:41:00and how much came down and everything. A really interesting sideline project, we
planted white pines around Kingston Steam Plant because they are very good
indicators of whether the air is good or not in it. And we monitored whether
those white pines lived or died around the plant. As it became known later, that
technique doesn't ap--work anymore and that something has to be done at the
power plant itself. A--again, we worked with industries that to make sure that
their release from their plant into the air met air quality standards and
everything like that on it. At one time the Air Quality Branch did forecasting
of weather for TVA, but later that was contracted out on it. But--uh--that
branch was located in Muscle Shoals, but it was under the--the headquarters
here in Knoxville on it.
MUMMERT: I wanted to mention too that, when--we've been talking about water
quality and air quality. --Uh--you--there was a lot more emphasis put
on--uh--those two subjects because of federal legislation at the time in the
early 1970s with the Clean Water Bill and I--and the Air Quality Bill, is that
right? And they probably both helped and hurt TVA in different ways.
BROWN: Yes and--uh--. Well like I--well--like I said the technique that TVA used
to meet the air quality especially standards around plants, later on was not an
acceptable technique today, and so things are quite different then only. But,
the idea was put it high enough up in the air and it won't affect right around
the plant or nearby and it'll-it'll come down in less quantities
00:43:00somewhere else. And of course, it affects, to a small degree,
the--the--uh--Great Smoky Mountain National Park, it effects cities downwind
from TVA plants and everything like that on it. But so, that aspect of TVA
changed radically over time because of legislation and court procedures on it
and everything like that.
MUMMERT: --Uh--other than--we--we covered the Engineering Lab, Air Branch, Water
Quality Branch. I'm missing one I think that you mentioned. Or maybe more than one.
BROWN: Well, one of them was the--uh--what we called the Hydraulic Data Branch.
They were the field people that went out and gathered whatever data we needed
for whatever we doing out into the field. They read stre--they went by stream
gauges and read them sometimes and called them in every day. They we--sometimes
the rainfall gauges and called them in. They did whatever we did--
00:44:00needed in terms of getting the information from the field into the headquarters
to do whatever was necessary on it. One other group I'll mention real quickly is
a staff group that worked long and hard on developing a very elaborate computer
program to determine where was the most efficient place that--for TVA to meet
its power loads at that particular moment. Whether at a dam, steam plant and at
a particular dam, which turbines under certain conditions would be the best to
use for the most efficient operation of the system. And they developed a very
elaborate p-program, I don't whether it's still in used or not. Something else
probably has developed. But, in order to help most efficiently use the fossil
fuel, the dams and the turbines--uh--gas turbines to meet the power load on it.
They worked years on that--on it and did a good job.
MUMMERT: Now, how would something like that work after they do a lot
00:45:00of research--and--they'd have to somehow communicate that into some guidelines
that are used?
BROWN: That--that particular thing was financed primarily by the power
funds--operation of the power system. After it was developed into a useful piece
of equipment, in this case a computer program, it was turned over to the power
people that determined which places to place the power load. So we--we--we were
not in the Office of Power, but they financed it--the work. And then we turned
it over to them when it was operational, and then we kept trying to improve it
and do it--the job better. So, that's the way it was placed into operation.
MUMMERT: Now, about when chronologically, was that, in the 1970s maybe or later or?
BROWN: It was more--nearly later on in the 1980s, and so forth. And I
00:46:00guess it ended pretty soon after I left TVA in--uh--1980. I don't know what much
has done about it since then on it. The group now has been--uh--disband on it
and most all the people have gone somewhere else or retired on it.
MUMMERT: The--uh--I think--uh--looking at your resume; I saw too that you were
Director or involved in--uh--Deputy Director of Office of Natural Resources.
--Is that what we've been talking about or is there more there than?
BROWN: Well--we talked around that on it. After I was here in Knoxville,
much to my surprise, I g--received a call from my supervisor one
00:47:00Saturday morning and said: "Bevan, you're gonna be promoted." And I thought
well, that was good in a way, but I wasn't looking for a promotion. And you'll
be transferred to Chattanooga to head up a division in Chattanooga.
Well--the--Environmental Quality Branch, I believe it was called. I didn't like
the idea at all, I told my supervisor I said: "I ain't looking for another job.
I like the job I've got right now. What options do I have"? He said: "Bevan, I
don't think you have any other options." And so off to Chattanooga I went and
headed up that branch, which was left over from a person leaving TVA. And I
wasn't given any instructions by the board or anything what they wanted me to
do. I--I when I think back on it, I don't know. But anyhow, then
00:48:00later on I was transferred from there to head up the Deputy Director of the
Office of Natural Resources in--headquartered Norris then. And I guess I don't
know where it is now. And that involved the--uh--Forestry Divisions and a lot of
other bunches I can't think of right now--on it. I hate to admit it, but that
didn't work out well. My supervisor and I were two different people, entirely
two different people and we just did not pull together on it. And it became
obvious that somebody had to--to go--leave on it. And I was approached by the
Assistant General Manager Dave [Sherrod] about the problem, and I offered to
come back to Knoxville as head of the--a division if they would bring
00:49:00me back at the grade I had then and the salary and that would relieve the
problem in Norris, they thought. And they took me up on that proposition, and
much to my pleasure, cause I was much happier back as Director of the Division
Water and Air Resources than I was working in the circumstances that I didn't
feel like I was adding anything positive to the functioning of the group. It
ended up, a lot of people sort of seemed to be on my side, and a lot of people
seemed to be on the--the manager's side and so therefore that won't work in a
large group. I think we had over 1,000 employees in that bunch. And--uh--the
solution seemed to be well--pleasing to the TVA General Manager Bill Willis
then. And I came back for the latter part of my tenure in Knoxville, which I
enjoyed an awful lot.
MUMMERT: In the end or end of your career at TVA, was involved basically as the
head of the Air and Water Division?
BROWN: Yes, it was--I was classified as Director of Air and Water Resources, on
as Division Director.
MUMMERT: You saw a lot of changes in those fields through your career at TVA?
Can you talk about a few?
BROWN: My changes where now?
MUMMERT: Changes. Maybe technological changes--uh--how--.
BROWN: --Uh--staffing changes--uh--. The number of people in the staff. One of
the changes I've s--seen--uh--witnessed that I just can't conceive how it is
now. I was clamitized to a Board of Directors composed of three people and a
General Manager and an operation of decision-making where the Board was
available almost daily and involved in daily decision-making. Til,
00:51:00the top management of the agency now is beyond my comprehension of with--the
current nine-member I guess board and their method of operation. So that's one
change I just and to--s--to some degree people's changing titles and everything.
The former titles are not used. So that--that changed and the--.
MUMMERT: But, fortunately for you, that all change happened after you left.
BROWN: After I left, cause I--if it had happened while I was there, I don't
whether I'd been able to move with the current or not. The other great big
change that occurred, all of the things that were sort of dear to my heart in my
career at TVA, Water Quality Air Quality and everything like that, was funded
primarily by appropriated money with a combination, some coming from
00:52:00the Office of Power, joint funding. Now--.
MUMMERT: Appropriated means appropriated by the U.S. Congress.
BROWN: Yup, right. And as I understand it now, TVA does not get any appropriated
money from Congress--on it--.
MUMMERT: That's correct.
BROWN: And so things that were funded by appropriated money from Congress have
been discontinued, either turned over to the state or decided we don't need to
do them and everything like that.
MUMMERT: And some a--a limited number are funded by the power proceeds.
BROWN: Right, well we had a limited--we had a limited number then funded by
power; some like the Reservoir Operations, it was jointly funded by power and
appropriations and some other things were. Air Quality and--and other work we
did but for the Office of Power. But, that to me when I think about it the fact
that what--I what I really sort of-- I devoted my whole career to and
00:53:00proud of now doesn't exist in TVA almost and on it. And I--I would have had a
hard--I don't know--well I guess I would have been eliminated, I would have been
said we have enough of you, get out the door on it.
MUMMERT: Or they might have found a new job for you,
BROWN: That's wishful thinking maybe.
MUMMERT: That would not have been in the area you're best--uh--best trained for.
BROWN: It'd of been a political job, probably and I'd--of g--I'd--of I'd of have
said: "Thank you, goodbye." on it and so forth on it. And--uh--that--uh--that's
a big change on it. I left TVA a little bit under--little bit of stress. But, it
was ideal when I left. For the maybe record, I was offered a retirement deal
that I could not refuse. Circumstance was a little bit odd. I got a call from
Chili Dean saying he was sort of heard
00:54:00about it. He said: "Why don't you sue them?" And I said: "I'm afraid I'd win."
He said: "Well, what's wrong with that?" I said: "What could be worse than
working in an environment where they don't want you anymore?" And I walked out
the door with a great retirement option. A little before I had planned to
retire, but it worked out extremely well. I continued to do some engineering
work in foreign countries, some locally and had a great retirement since then on
it. But back to the question, that's the two biggest things I can think of.
And--along with that, perhaps, is the fact that my work with TVA I got to work
with so many people that were so helpful, so concerned, so skilled and such a
family affair, til that would have been dissolved, and I don't know whether it's
like that now or not. I keep seeing in the paper about more and more
00:55:00people gone, more and more work being contracted. And--uh--I just can't conceive
of that in a way on it.
MUMMERT: Well, looking back on your career at TVA--uh--. Here's a tough question
for you: what would you consider to be one of your major accomplishments? Or how
would you phrase that answer?
BROWN: I don't know how I would phrase that answer in a way, on it. I--I think I
was judged to have done a real good job because I got promoted to higher
positions on it. I--uh--accomplished a lot of things in getting things
more--uh--operational for the days' environment. And I guess my biggest
accomplishment, when I think back on it; it wasn't so much my capability in a
lot of areas, but my luck or maybe capability to have people on hand
00:56:00that could take of so many things on it. I remember one occasion with John
Waters, when a fellow was asking him some real
technical questions, and John says: "Hey, Bevan Brown's back there, and
he'll--he knows the answer." I didn't know the answer either, but I knew I had
people that worked for me that knew the answer, but Waters didn't fully
understand that on it. I had one circumstance that unbelievable in a way on it.
We were in Washington for a Congressional hearing. Chili
Dean was on the spot, they asked him a water quality
type problem on fisheries, catfish in Kentucky Dam. He
said: "We've got Bevan Brown back here in the back, and he can answer that
question." Well, the unusual part on it, Bevan Brown wasn't next in line to be
asked that question. He just jumped over some people because he knew me. I had
to go sit at the table and answer some of the Congressional questions
00:57:00on why unusually the catfish being caught in Kentucky
Dam had bad-looking flesh and was not marketable. And
a lot of trouble was being caused by that, and was--was accused of TVA having
something to do with it. Rather unusually, we thought it was everything
imaginable, but it turned out to be the technique the catfish farmers had
started using to slaughter, kill the catfish. They electrocuted them. And when
they electrocuted them, the current changed the texture and the color of the
white catfish meat on it. And we finally found the answer. But anyhow, that
was--uh--and Jim Sasser put in a special appropriations in
our--uh--appropriations for us to have more money to find the answer
00:58:00on that on it. TVA didn't move the money like they told Sasser they was, but
that's the way everything worked. And I don't know w--if he would have cared
anyhow, but anyhow he said I did it, and TVA solved the problem on it.
MUMMERT: And they couldn't blame that one on TVA.
BROWN: No, I didn't turn out to be. That--that was very interesting. We didn't
know whether it was the f--f--uh--farming practices around Kentucky Reservoir,
and the fertilizer getting into the reservoir. We didn't know whether it was
some small, real bad chemical being released by some of the plants at
Johnsonville or what. It was a total loss to start with as to what had happened
all of a sudden. And it was all kinds of possibilities, but it turned out to be
one we never dreamed about on it and--uh--. And so that was a very interesting
aspect of it. But, all those kind of things when I think back on them, I am
proud of my career there. I did the best I could and I apparently was
00:59:00rewarded, I thought, generously for that, and I don't have any regrets of not
leaving TVA when I was offered another job on it and--with the Corps of
MUMMERT: Well, it sounds like there was a--you and--uh--TVA were a good match.
And--uh--you had a very--most--most interesting career. But also I--I'm a bit
younger than you are and I know that you have high respect among a lot of people
at TVA even today that knew you--know you. I'm going to--uh--get near the end of
the interview here, but I--I have--on--I'll let you say whatever you want to
but, I have one question. And this is probably the difficult--most difficult
question. --Uh--are there any questions I have not asked that you wish I had?
BROWN: That in--on the spur of the moment, it's real difficult on it. I
thought about--when I was thinking about this interview, and things I
01:00:00had. I saw a circumstance and was part of it. One Saturday, morning in the TVA
board room on in--in the Sprankle Building on Union Avenue, we'd had a face-off
with the Corps of Engineers who we recorded we--uh--rec--the operation of
Kentucky Reservoirs, coordinated with them. They issued orders that we exceed
our right to flood some land in the Kentucky Reservoir. The land rights in
Kentucky are very complex. We refused to do it. The reason for doing it,
according to the Corps, was to save some flooding along the Mississippi River,
of farmers along the Mississippi River. That was reported to the Mississippi
River Commission, who governed what happened on the Mississippi River.
The Corps of Engineers flew a planeload of Generals into Knoxville on
01:01:00a Saturday, and we met in the boardroom. And the Generals told Red Wagner, and I
don't remember if there was any board members other than him there or not, that
they were ordering him to order us to do what the Corps said to do to, to save
the farmers on the Mississippi River. We had a little sideline meeting there Bob
Marquis was the General Counsel, I and my supervisor and the operation of the
River Control Branch was there. And Wagner listened to all of the pluses and
minuses, and the brief time we went back into the room with the Generals then
Wagner said: "We're not going to do it." To see the expression on those
Generals' face was unbelievable. They looked at each other, did you hear it,
he's said he's going to disobey us. And we--he said they will take
01:02:00this to Washington and to see if a lawsuit can be filed and everything. But,
that was an unusual experience, and I remember I to this day in detail that
Wagner said: "No we're not on it." And we did not flood some land in Kentucky
Reservoir to save some flooding on the Mississippi River. That leads me to one
thought. As a result, thereof I was assigned the responsibility to coordinate
with the C--Corps of Engineers in the Ohio River Division to develop a
Memorandum of Understanding so we wouldn't have that face-off again. We worked
long and hard and f--finally developed a Memorandum of Understanding that said
when we would and would not violate the land rights in Kentucky Reservoir. I
wonder to this day whether anybody ever knows--uh--where that Memorandum of
Understanding or that has been lost forever. It has never been needed since
then, but it might be needed again today. In the end, we said we'd
01:03:00only flood land in the Kentucky Reservoir to save the dike on the Mississippi
River floodway from being blown up and a lot of land flooded. But, otherwise we
would not violate the land's rights in the Kentucky Reservoir on it. But, I
don't know what exactly led me to think about that, but I can remember to this
day Red Wagner telling those generals, no we're not going to obey your orders.
We gonna do what Bevan and his group says what we should do and the shock on
their--their faces on it.
MUMMERT: I didn't know of--anything about that, but I do know, I guess that
occasionally--uh--TVA can just shut the flow of the Tennessee River--uh--can it
not. When--uh--there is--uh--excessive flooding on the Mississippi or--or the Ohio?
BROWN: It can un--but there's an uncontrolled canal between Barkley
01:04:00(Lake) on the--uh--Cumberland River and Kentucky (Lake) on the Tennessee River,
and so whatever you do in Kentucky affects the Cumberland and the Cumberland
affects the Kentucky on it--Reservoir on it. The land rights I'm thinking about,
is we only have rights to go above 365' 10 feet below the top of the gates for
12 months of the year, for 6 months of the year, we can go on up to 375'. And so
it was a violation of that ten time factor on it. And it was to save some
farmers that were farming land along the Mississippi River at their own risk.
And so TVA took sort of dim view of flooding. --Uh--the Corps of Engineers said
we--if you sued and lose, we'll reimburse TVA for your losses. --Uh--Bob Marquis
said: "No, that won't, cause we can't be guaranteed you could do
01:05:00that." And so that was rejected on it. But that was just a little small
incident, it will never be wiped from my mind on it. W--Wagner said no on it.
MUMMERT: It kind of place--puts an explanation point on--uh--some of the
historical disagreements between TVA and the Corps of Engineers.
BROWN: To a degree we--we--we had some disagreements--uh--made me think of
another one one time. Much smaller, but I'm proud of. The park down at
Guntersville where the--uh--retirees' annual get-together at Guntersville
Reservoir is on a piece of a park land down there.
MUMMERT: And Guntersville is in northern--northern Alabama.
BROWN: Right. And--uh--when that park idea was being developed, the City of
Guntersville had to come up with about $200,000 dollars, as I recall,
01:06:00to pay their share, and the Corps was going to prepare the park. Maybe a little
bit illegally, we came up with an idea. We gave the Guntersville--the City of
Guntersville $200,000 dollars not doing very much work, and they took that money
and matched it with the Corps of Engineers. Which, I got a call from one of the
Corps of Engineers' men and said: "Don't you know that's illegal? They were
supposed to come up with private money to match, and that's government money
matching government money, and they're not doing what the contract says." I
can't remember exactly how I handled it, but--uh--the General Counsel's Office
had sort of said well it would be okay on it. But anyhow, I sort of said: "Oh
no, they're not going to that, they've done something out here torn down a barn
and we gave them $200,000 dollars for tearing down a barn. But, every time the
annual--uh--picnic is held at Guntersville, I think about the fact
01:07:00that that park area, as I recall, was the result of coming up with $200,000
dollars for the City of Guntersville not to do much work, in turn was used to
match the funding they need for the Corps to build that park on it. Not the only
thing I did a little bit ill-illegally, maybe but sometimes you had to push the
envelope pretty far. One quick thing, when Sequoyah was being built, there was a
small--uh--water supply company there, they were in the way. And we tried to
move them, and everything like that. And it finally came down that they would
sign off on everything if we gave them a backhoe. I was approached by one of the
attorneys, Leonard Smith, and came up with a backhoe. And I--through my division
I gave them a backhoe, they signed off on Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. When I
retired, Leonard Smith gave me a little--small backhoe, as a memento
01:08:00and I still have that backhoe cause of the fact that I had stretched the law in
order for Sequoyah to gets its approval on it--. That's a very interesting
things happened on it, very interesting people.
MUMMERT: But of course, TVA had some flexibility to get things done. That's the
way I would say that.
BROWN: Well. Well, we found flexibility. It's--uh--since I left, the operation
of the reservoir system is a lot more devoted to other things than flood
control, navigation and power. When I was there, if it didn't fit those three
things, operation of the system for flood control, navigation and it's
consistent with that to generate power, it was awfully--could not be done. But,
I've noticed lately, and I'm glad of that, that the General Counsel's Offices
has said well, maybe we can do a little bit of this and do a little bit of that
for--to help with the water quality and things like that on it. So,
01:09:00some of that's still being done on it. And--uh--lot depends on who's head of the
General Counsel Offices and legal opinions and things can change with time on
it. We had another one--.
MUMMERT: Well, there are a lot more demands, too, on the river system, I--I mean
the--primarily the growth of the population and industry, means that
there--there has to be more done.
BROWN: And pub--public interest and everything like that. But, I remember one
time Chili Dean called me up directly and said:
"Bevan, doesn't this violate flood control and navigation"? And I said: "Yeah."
And I--I said: " But we're not going to operate a difference unless the law has
changed" and so Chili --but things changed on it.
--Uh--a small thing, on it, for a long time, we wanted to put horns on the
downstream of dams so whenever the--the--r--turbines were going to be cut on,
fish--people and everything in boats would be warned. For a long time, the
General Counsel's Office would not approve that. They said suppose the horns
failed and everything like that on it. I think now they have some
01:10:00sort of warning system which was badly needed, whenever those turbines were
going to come on right downstream from the dam on it. I don't know what I've
left out. The only thing I've left out, I worked with some very unusual people,
very odd and--and--. I this--I don't know about this one--I worked with one
individual if it had been in today's climate, I would have been concerned that
he would have shown up for work with a gun and shot somebody cause he felt he
was persecuted because of him being biracial, and things he could believe and do
was unbelievable. He would go out at lunch time and if a helicopter flew over,
he said the FBI was following him. He went over to the FBI office several times
and knocked on the door and wanted to see the file that they had on him. He
filed a grievance about people using his trash can instead of their
01:11:00own trash can at one time. He filed a grievance about people slamming their desk
drawer to irritate him. And finally he--we were going to try to get him some
help, and he was going to talk to our personnel officer, and when he got in the
office, he looked up above and saw something he thought was a recording device,
and he wouldn't say a word. But anyhow, that shows you how things have changed.
I think about that lots of time, and if that had been today, I would have been
extremely nervous that he might have just walked in one day cause he was very
unbalanced--very unbalanced on it. And--uh--I don't know whether that's part of
worthwhile information or not on it.
MUMMERT: Well--uh--it's part of being a manager over a lot of different people.
BROWN: Yes, that's right. It was a lot of different people. I--I had some
strange ones, one that would go to the head, and wash his hands and bring the
towels back and dry them and use them again. He rolled up his adding machine
tape paper backwards and used it for scratch paper. And things like
01:12:00that on it. But, there was only one of him, and he was very unusual--very
unusual. --Uh--since he's deceased, I can say his name was Bruce Whitlock.
MUMMERT: Well, I--uh--can't come up with any other questions for you, but I
appreciate the time that you spent. And it's been very interesting.
BROWN: I appreciate the opportunity, it's caused me to, in advance, to think
about a lot of things in my work at TVA and--and--uh--my joy with my
accomplishments. If not to brag, but also with my satisfaction of having spent
all 38 years of my life in TVA, and TVA giving me some other opportunities like
to do some foreign work that helped me bridge the period from preretirement to
after retirement on it. One job was to go to Mozambique one time. One
01:13:00trip there was enough for me on it. Incidentally, I called up Wagner who was my
friend, they wanted me to come back for some reason and I never knew why, but I
didn't want to go back. And so I got him to the--the United Nations who we were
working for that I--my job was so busy at the moment I could not be spared to
come back again. And Wagner sort of stretched the truth, there but he saved my
neck from going back to Mozambique again on it. And I think I got credit for
things that weren't my credit when I was in Mozambique. Mozambique was awarded
$10 million dollars that happened to be while I was there and just happened to
be while I had gone down to the Ambassador's office to report in that I was in
Mozambique. And I believe the government thought I had something to do with that
$10 million dollars, and that's the reason they wanted me to come back. And I
had nothing to do with the government giving them $10 million dollars
01:14:00because of a drought.
MUMMERT: Well, that sounds like you should have gone back.
BROWN: What can you do to try to help a country that's in civil war? Whatever
was good that was done at night was blown up by the rebels. Whatever was done in
the daytime was blonde up at night by the rebels. What could you do for a
country that had run all the Portuguese people out of the country, and that was
all of their brain power? And the usual education was about the sixth grade, and
what in the world can be done when that's the only technical capability they
have. I couldn't find the answer on it to be honest with you.
MUMMERT: Well, yeah, I--especially for a water systems engineer from TVA.
BROWN: Yeah, well, I was--that's right. I was a US representative, and there
were representatives from a lot of other foreign countries, including
01:15:00Russia. And--uh--we filed a report, but I don't think there's much in the report
that would have really been helpful to them. I wrote the chapter on the need for
education, but--uh--uh--I don't know whatever happened to that on it. At that
time Mozambique, couldn't decide whether they wanted to be a democracy or a
communistic bunch, they were leaning toward a communistic bunch. The Russian
delegate there was put up in very nice facilities, for the--as Mozambique was
concerned. The rooms other people had, our water went off about 6 or 7 o'clock
in the morning, and you'd better have your tub full of water to dip out to flush
your commode during the day, otherwise you wasn't going to have any water. And
it was--it was pathetically poor--pathetically poor. The only jobs was people
going over into the coal mines, diamond mines in South
America and working; but no resources other
01:16:00than cashew nuts and--and--uh--some fisheries in the country on it. No, I don't
want to go back.
MUMMERT: Well, listen. Thank you very much again.
BROWN: I enjoyed it. It was a--been a pleasure that I did enjoy this much on it
but it's obvious I love to talk. That's all I've got now.
MUMMERT: Well, thank you very much.
BROWN: You're quite welcome.